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This paper is on the impact of the Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014 
(LRAA)1 on the Temporary Employment Services (TES) in South Africa. The TES 
practice involves a triangular relationship where the TES places 
workers/employees with a client to provide labour for the benefit of the client. Over 
the years, there has been an outcry from organised labour for the ban of the TES 
practice on the basis that it encouraged the exploitation of workers and 
undermined job security. Other issues associated with the practice were low 
wages and inferior conditions of service of the placed workers compared to 
employees employed by the client doing same or similar work.         
Initially, the TES practice was regulated in a limited way by the Labour Relations 
Act of 19562 as well as the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA).3 The LRA 
initially only regulated the TES practice in so far as it recognised that the TES is 
the employer of placed workers and it created provisions for joint and several 
liability for the client and the TES under certain limited circumstances.4 Despite 
these attempts to regulate the practice, organised labour felt it was still not good 
enough as the same problems continued to persist, as a result they continued  to 
challenge the constitutionality of this practice and called for it to be completely 
banned.5 In response, the legislature introduced the Labour Relations Amendment 
Act No 6 of 2014 (LRAA) in an effort to close the loopholes identified. Section 
198A(3)(b) (the deeming provision) introduced by the LRAA stipulates that after a 
period of three months of placement of workers by a TES with a client, the client is 
deemed the employer of those workers.        
It is the interpretation of this deeming provision that has sparked a legal debate in 
South Africa, resulting in two views on how the deeming provision should be 
 
1 Hereinafter referred to as the LRAA. 
2 Hereinafter referred to as the LRA of 1956. 
3 Hereinafter referred to as the LRA. 
4 Section 198(4) of the LRA. 
5 COSATU, FAWU, NEHAWU, NUM, NUMSA, SACCAWU; AND SATAWU “Submissions on Labour 
Brokering to the Parliament Portfolio Committee 26 August 2009” available at  
https://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/labour-broking-a-form-of-slavery--cosatu-et-al.(last 






interpreted. The first view is the ‘dual employment’ interpretation which suggests 
that after the three months placement has lapsed, both the TES and the client 
become employers of the placed workers. The second view is the ‘sole 
employment’ interpretation and it proposes that after the three months has lapsed, 
the client becomes the sole employer of the placed employees.   
This legal debate was eventually settled by the Constitutional Court (CC) in 2018 
in the Assign Services (Pty) Limited v National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa and Others (CCT194/17) [2018] ZACC 22 (Assign Services). The majority 
view in the CC ruled that the sole employment interpretation is the correct 
interpretation to be ascribed to the deeming provision, whilst the minority view 
favoured the dual employment interpretation.   
This dissertation will critically analyse the legal jurisprudence involved in this 
debate as well as the implications of the CC decision on the operations of the TES 
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CHAPTER 1 -  INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction   
Labour brokering, also known as temporary employment services is a practice 
which involves three parties in an employment arrangement (the words Labour 
Broker and TES will be used interchangeably henceforth). In this practice the TES 
recruits and places workers with a company (client) to perform labour in favour of 
the client. 6 In exchange for providing these workers, the TES receives a fee from 
the client.7 Accordingly, this practice creates a triangular relationship.  
In this triangular relationship, a relationship between the TES and its client is 
formed, and this relationship is generally regulated by a service level agreement 
(SLA).8  Another relationship is between the TES and the placed workers. A third 
relationship exists between the placed workers and the client. In this triangular 
arrangement, our law has for several years only recognised the relationship 
between the TES and the placed workers, as well as the relationship between the 
TES and its client. The third relationship between the client and the placed 
workers was not recognised,  nor was it regulated, even though the existence of 
such a relationship was clear in the parties’ interactions with each other.9  
Given the lack of a recognition in the relationship between the client and the 
placed workers, this created a loophole in the legal system for clients and TESs to 
 
6 Benjamin 2016 ILJ 30.   
7 Section 198(1) of the LRA. 
8 Theron 2005 ILJ 628; Regulatory Impact Assessment of Selected Provisions of the Labour 
Relations Amendment Bill 2010, Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Bill 2010, 
Employment Equity Amendment Bill 2010 and Employment Services Bill 2010: A Report prepared 
for the Department of Labour and the Presidency 33.   





treat the placed workers unfairly and to subject them to unfair working conditions.10 
For example, workers placed with the client would receive wages that were 
significantly less than those received by employees of the client doing same or 
similar work.  
The challenges associated with this practice as demonstrated above caused 
resistance from employee organisations, particularly from the Confederation of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the National Council of Trade Unions 
(NACTU) who called for the total and complete ban of this practice in South 
African law.11 COSATU highlighted that this practice is akin to the system of labour 
under the period of slavery as it perpetuates the exploitation of the vulnerable work 
force, but on a broader scale, the exploitation of black people in South Africa as 
the vulnerable and powerless class.12   
In response to this call, the legislature introduced the LRAA which contained 
mechanisms intended to provide adequate protection to the vulnerable employees 
involved in the TES practice.13 The most significant mechanism introduced by the 
LRAA was under section 198A(3)(b). This provision is what is now known as the 
deeming provision.14  
In terms of the LRAA, temporary service is defined inter alia as employment that is 
less than three months. Section 198A(3)(b) reads that for purposes of the LRA, an 
employee not performing  such temporary services for the client is - (i) deemed to 
 
10 Van Eck BPS “Temporary employment services (labour brokers) in South Africa and Namibia.” 
(2010) 13(2) PER 107.   
11Labour Brokering: Public hearing continued. available at https://pmg.org.za/committee-
meeting/10707/. (Last accessed 03 October 2019) 
12 http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=10371, (Last accessed 28 November 2018). 
13 Labour Relations Amendment Act 6 of 2014. 





be the employee of that client and the client is deemed to be the employer; and (ii) 
subject to the provisions of section 198B, employed on an indefinite basis by the 
client.           
In a nutshell, the deeming provision therefore provides that workers placed with a 
client under the TES practice will be deemed to be the employees of the client if 
placed with a client for a period exceeding three months. It is the interpretation of 
this deeming provision that has sparked one of the most interesting legal debates 
in South Africa. The question at the heart of this legal debate is the following – 
' if the client becomes the employer of the placed workers after the 
three months placement period has lapsed, does this mean the TES 
falls away from the triangular arrangement or do both the client and the 
TES become dual employers of the placed workers post the deeming?  
The first case to attempt to give meaning to the deeming provision is Assign 
Services.15 This case was first referred to the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) by the National Union of Metal Workers of 
South Africa (NUMSA) on behalf of its members who were procured by a TES to a 
client for purposes of providing labour to that client.16 After three months of their 
placement, NUMSA contended that, because of the deeming provision in the 
LRAA, the placed workers had now become the employees of the client and the 
client had become their employer. 
 
15 Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v Krost Shelving and Racking (Pty) Ltd and National Union of Metal 






The TES disputed this interpretation and submitted that the correct interpretation 
to be ascribed to the deeming provision is that, after the three months period the 
client and the TES both become the employers of the placed workers and that a 
dual employment relationship is formed. At the CCMA the commissioner, Abdool 
Carrim Osman, agreed with NUMSA's interpretation and concluded that after the 
deeming provision is triggered, the client became the sole employer of the placed 
workers. This interpretation is often referred to as the 'sole employment' 
interpretation.  
The TES challenged this decision at the Labour Court (LC)  by way of a review 
application maintaining its view that the proper interpretation to be ascribed to the 
deeming provision is that of dual employment, with both the TES and the client 
becoming joint employers.17 The LC found in favour of the TES' interpretation and 
concluded that the deeming provision created dual employment, with both the TES 
and the client becoming employers of the workers. This interpretation is often 
referred to as the 'dual employment' interpretation.18   
Aggrieved by this outcome, NUMSA took the matter on appeal to the Labour 
Appeal Court (LAC). The LAC found in favour of NUMSA and confirmed the 
interpretation ascribed by the CCMA to the deeming provision.19 The labour broker 
took this matter to the CC. The CC as the court of final instance concluded that the 
sole employment interpretation is what is intended by the deeming provision and 
consequently confirmed the initial decision of the CCMA as well as the decision of 
 
17 Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others [2015] ZALCJHB 283.   
18 Ibid.  





the LAC.20  Accordingly, the law as it currently stands favours the sole employment  
interpretation.  
Having regard to the above, this dissertation will provide the historic overview of 
the TES practice in South Africa and demonstrate the legislature’s attempts to 
regulate the practice over the years. This dissertation will critically examine how 
our courts have interpreted the deeming provision as well as highlight the dangers 
which will confront the TES practice as a consequence of the CC’s interpretation 
of the deeming provision.     
1.2 Research Question  
Considering the above, this dissertation will set out the history of the labour 
brokering practice in South Africa. It will explore and demonstrate the historic 
shortcomings of this practice which motivated the need for its regulation. This 
dissertation will further explore the shortcomings that persisted irrespective of the 
legislature’s attempts to regulate the practice under the LRA of 1956 as well as the 
LRA and how these shortcomings has been subsequently addressed through the 
LRAA.    
Ultimately, this dissertation seeks to address the following questions:  
What are the implications of the Constitution Court's judgment in 
Assigned Services for the labour brokering practice in South Africa? 
Did this judgement unintendedly put an end to the labour brokering 
practice in South Africa, and ultimately fulfilled the wishes of 
COSATU?  
 
20 Assign Services (Pty) Limited v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa and Others 





1.3 Research Methodology 
The research methodology used in this dissertation is desktop research. A lot of 
reference will be made to the LRA of 1956, the LRA and the LRAA as well as its 
explanatory memorandum.21 A critical analysis will be conducted to explore 
whether these statutes properly regulated the labour brokering practice in South 
Africa and whether such regulations provide adequate protection to the employees 
involved in this practice.  
In doing this analysis, I will refer to relevant case law that dealt with the 
interpretation and application of the LRA legislation in labour brokering practice. 
These cases will serve to demonstrate that the protection previously afforded to 
employees involved in this practice were not adequate and left loopholes for TESs 
and their clients to exploit the workers. To back my arguments up, I will be relying 
on various journal articles and research papers which addresses the issues 
associated with the labour brokering practice in South Africa.  
In concluding this dissertation, I will place reliance on the latest jurisprudence 
which has brought some clarity on the principles regulating this practice in South 
Africa, particularly on the debate of who becomes the employer in labour brokering 
arrangements once the deeming provision is triggered. I will critically analyse the 
Assign Services jurisprudence and opine whether the decision arrived at by the 
CC was the most appropriate decision.22  
1.4 Chapter Outline 
 
21 LRA.  





This dissertation has five chapters –  
Chapter 1 
The first chapter has set out a brief overview of the topic, particularly the issues 
sought to be addressed. This chapter has also set out the applicable research 
question as well as the research methodology that will be used in the completion 
of this dissertation.    
Chapter 2 
This chapter will set out the history of this practice in South Africa prior to the 
introduction of the LRA of 1956 and thereafter. This chapter will detail the 
shortcomings of this practice prior to its most recent regulation and demonstrate 
the flaws associated with the LRA's attempts to regulate this practice prior to the 
introduction of the LRAA.     
I will also, with reference to recent case law, draw a distinction between 
outsourcing service providers as well as the labour brokering practice. The two 
concepts are often misunderstood to mean the same thing though they are 
fundamentally different in practice. I will draw the distinction between the two 
concepts and clarify that the deeming provisions under the LRAA as well as the 
CC’s decision in the Assigned Services judgment does not affect the outsourcing 
practice but only seeks to regulate the labour brokering practice in South Africa.          
This chapter will also briefly discuss the mechanisms introduced by the LRAA in its 





practice as well as the issue pertaining to the debate as to the proper 
interpretation to be ascribed to the deeming provision under the LRAA.  
Chapter 3 
When the LRAA was introduced in 2015, a debate ensued as to how certain 
provisions should be interpreted, particularly the deeming provision under section 
189A (3).  The first and only dispute that assisted us in dealing with this debate 
was the dispute in Assigned Services.23 This dispute has since been settled at the 
CC. This chapter will be analysing the different interpretations ascribed to the 
deeming provision under the LRAA by the CCMA as well as the LC in the 
Assigned Services judgment. This chapter will basically be a critical analysis of the 
decisions reached by these two respective judicial forums. 
The CCMA and the LC both ascribed different interpretations to the deeming 
provision, giving birth to what has become well known as the ‘sole employment’ 
and the ‘dual employment’ interpretations. In this chapter I will be discussing these 
two concepts in detail and highlighting the challenges and advantages associated 
with each. 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 will continue in the same fashion as chapter 3 and will compare and 
contrast the LAC's and the CC's interpretation of the deeming provision. This 
chapter will also highlight some of the controversial issues flowing from the CC's 
interpretation of the deeming provision which may have a negative impact on the 
future of the TES practice in South Africa. 
 





I will also be providing my own opinion on the findings of the CC, particularly the 
interpretation of the deeming provision in the LRAA. I will argue whether this 
interpretation affords better and adequate protection to the employees whilst also 
sustaining the practice of labour brokering in South Africa.          
Chapter 5  
This will be the last chapter of this dissertation and will highlight what the current 
state of law is in respect of the regulation of the operations of labour brokering in 
South Africa.  
This chapter will also highlight the practical implications of the position in our law in 
respect of the operations of TES and give a view of whether, considering the 
majority and minority views expressed by the CC in the Assign Services 
jurisprudence, this practice is currently sustainable and as attractive as it used to 
be to clients. 
I will opine on the future of this practice in South Africa considering the CC’s 







CHAPTER 2 -  THE HISTORY OF THE TES PRACTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
AND ITS INSUFFICIENT REGULATION.  
2.1  The History of the TES Practice in South Africa 
The TES practice has been a part of the South African labour framework for many 
years dating as far back as the early 1920's, even though often without any form of 
legal regulation.24 The TES practice involves the procuring of workers by one 
company, known as the labour broker, to another company in exchange for a fee.  
The TES practice first received minimal regulation in South Africa in the 1950's 
under the LRA of 1956, and to some extent, continued to be regulated in terms of 
similar principles under the LRA.25 Even though the LRA of 1956 touched on the 
issue of labour brokers, it did not provide proper and adequate regulation of the 
practice.26  For example, the LRA of 1956 did not stipulate who the employer was 
in this triangular arrangement involving the agency, the placed workers as well as 
the client, it only made reference to labour brokers and their offices.27   
The LRA of 1956’s silence on who the employer was in the triangular arrangement 
gave rise to threat of job security to the placed workers involved in this practice 
who would often not know who their true employer was when they wanted to 
enforce their rights as employees.28 The LRA was also silent on the regulation of 
other pertinent issues pertaining to terms and conditions of employment of the 
 
24 Botes 2014 SA Merc LJ 110.   
25 LRA of 1956, see also LRA. 
26 Botes 2015 SALJ 101. Other atypical forms of work include part-time work, casual work, seasonal 
work, fixed term employment homework, subcontract work and franchising (see Mhone 1998 ILJ 
207); Le Roux “The World of Work: Forms of engagement in South Africa” 14,18.  
27 Section 2(3) of the LRA of 1956.  
28 Botes A ‘Answers to the questions? A critical analysis of the Amendments to the Labour Relations 





placed workers, such as;  working hours, how issues of discipline would be 
regulated, who would bear liability for the placed workers for claims of unfair 
dismissal and/or unfair labour practices, and no provisions were made for how the 
placed workers could collectively bargain with either the agency or the client.29 
This silence on fundamental employment issues gave room for many companies 
to use these gaps in our law to subject workers engaged in labour brokering 
practices to unfair treatment, often leaving the placed workers confused as to who 
to bring a claim against in cases of unfair treatment.30     
It was only when the LRA of 1956 was amended in the 1980’s through the 
Labour Relations Amendment Act 2 of 198331 that the TES practice was 
granted legal recognition by means of a statutory definition. It was also for the 
first time through the LRAA of 1983 that the TES was recognised as an 
employer of the placed workers.32  
The LRAA of 1983 defined labour brokers as agencies and in section 1(3) 
defined the labour broker practice as follows – "an agency is any person, who 
for reward procures services of workers, to perform work for a client and for 
which services such persons are remunerated by the agent.”33 In the LRA and 
in defining labour brokering practice, the term 'agency' was excluded and 
 
29 Theron 2008 ILJ 1. 
30 Van Niekerk et al Law @ Work 69.  See also Mills 2004 ILJ 1216. A case study was once carried 
out in the hotel industry, particularly Southern Suns, to illustrate the abuses and exploitation that the 
workers in the cleaning industry faced. It was reported that the status of these workers was 
indeterminate in that they were considered to be independent contractors when in actual fact they 
were temporary employees. Moreover, if a worker did not get through a specific number of rooms 
per day, that employee was compelled to work overtime, with no pay to meet a minimum salary. If 
the employees had grievances regarding either wages or conditions of employment, they were often 
referred from one authority figure to the other in their own time. As a result, these employees seldom 
managed to have their grievances resolved.   
31 Hereinafter referred to as the LRAA of 1983. 
32 Section 1(3)(a) of the LRAA of 1983.  





substituted with the term 'Temporary Employment Services'. Interestingly, the 
LRA retained a similar definition of labour brokering as its predecessor.34 
Section 198(1) of the LRA defines the TES practice as follows –  
‘… any person who, for reward, procures for or provides to a client 
other person (a) who render services to, or perform work for, the 
client; (b) and who are remunerated by the temporary employment 
service.’  
It is evident from the definition of the labour brokering practice that the LRA 
adopted a similar approach to the practice of labour brokering as its 
predecessor. Nothing much changed from the definition of the LRAA of 1983 as 
well as the definition under the LRA.    
2.2 The triangular relationship 
An analysis of the LRA's definition of TES demonstrates that, a TES is a company 
that enters into an agreement, often referred to as a service level agreement 
(SLA), with another company which becomes the TES's client, with the 
understanding that the TES will provide the client with worker/s to perform work for 
the client at the client's premises.35 In return the client will pay the TES a fee. The 
TES remunerates the workers placed with the client for their provision of labour to 
the client.36 Evident from this practice is that a triangular relationship is created 
between the TES, the placed workers and the client.37  The triangular relationship 
 
34 Benjamin 2016 ILJ 30.   
35 E Gericke ‘Temporary Employment Services: Closing a loophole in Section 198 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995’ 99. 
36 BPS Van Eck ‘Temporary Employment Services (Labour Brokers) in South Africa and Namibia’ 
(2010) PER/PELJ (13) 2 108. 
37 Theron 2005 ILJ 619, 620. Other forms of triangular relationships include franchising and 
homework. Franchising is when a franchisor licenses a franchisee to operate a business using the 





exists to split the functions and responsibilities of the TES and the client for a fee 




       
 
 Client                          Employees 
  
The TES provides the workers to the client and the workers provide labour to the 
client, normally on the client's premises and in accordance with the client's 
instructions.38 The functions and responsibilities of the TES are generally related 
to remuneration and human resource management of the placed workers and 
nothing more.39   
The TES is rarely involved in the actual work provided by the placed workers to 
the client. The TES plays an intermediary role and assumes some of the ancillary 
 
Homework (or outwork), on the other hand, is brokered through an intermediary who has neither the 
capacity nor the intention to provide goods or services himself or herself; instead he or she contracts 
to acquire a workforce to perform the work.  See also Van Eck BPS “Temporary employment services 
(Labour Brokers) in South Africa and Namibia” (2010) 13(2) PER 107 pg.108.   
38 Botes A. ‘Answers to questions: A critical analysis of the amendments to the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995 with regard to labour brokers.’ (2014) 26 SAMERC LJ 110 pg. 114.   
39 Craig Bosch ‘The Proposed 2012 Amendments Relating to Non-Standard employment: What will 





responsibilities such as discipline that would be typically handled by an employer 
however the TES has no influence on the working conditions of the placed workers 
as their labour is provided at the client's premises in accordance with the client's 
instructions and terms.40 The functions and responsibilities of the client are related 
to day-to-day management, work allocation and performance evaluation of the 
placed workers.41 
The client is also responsible for the working conditions of the placed workers 
since they are placed at the client's business premises.42 The client usually has 
the power to discontinue the placed workers' services.43 The TES practice is very 
similar and is often misconstrued to be the same as that of outsourcing/service 
providers. The conflation of the two concepts has often created a lot of confusion 
and misunderstanding in society considering the LRAA and the CC’s judgment in 
Assigned Services.   
2.3  The distinction between Outsourcing and TES practice 
The dissimilarities between TES and outsourcing in South Africa has left many 
confused as to the application of the deeming provisions and the constitutional 
court's judgment in Assigned Services.44 The confusion is so because the words 
'outsourcing' and 'labour brokering' are often used interchangeably even though 
 
40E Gericke op cit (n35).   
41Ibid.  
42 J Theron ‘The shift to services and triangular employment: Implications for labour market reform’ 
(2008) 29 ILJ 1-21 
43 E Gericke op cit (n35). 








they do not mean the same thing, nor have the same application and 
consequences in law.45  
Many people have wondered whether the deeming provisions of the LRA are 
applicable to employees of service providers in outsourcing arrangements. Labour 
brokering and outsourcing are two different concepts. Service providers are 
companies/organisations that are procured by a client for purposes of rendering a 
service to their client. They operate as independent contractors who are 
contracted by a client to render a service.46  
One of the leading authorities dealing with the distinction between independent 
contractors and labour brokers is the 2019 LC decision in CHEP South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd v Shardlow N.O and others.47 In this 
case,  Contracta-Force Corporate Solutions (Pty) Limited (C-Force) entered into 
an SLA with  CHEP South Africa (Pty) Ltd (CHEP) in terms of which C-Force 
would  render pallet conditioning services at the premises of CHEP in exchange 
for an agreed fee per pallet repaired. C-Force employed 201 employees for 
purposes of rendering these services to CHEP.48  
In 2015 the 201 employees employed by C-Force referred a dispute to the CCMA 
in terms of which they sought to enforce rights under section 198A(3) and (5) of 
the LRA, .i.e. that after three months of rendering services to CHEP, they were 
deemed employees of CHEP and should not be treated less favourably than 




47  CHEP South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Shardlow N.O and others [2019] JOL 40990 (LC). 
48 Ibid, para 1 





challenge, CHEP argued that its relationship with C-Force is not regulated by 
section 198A of the LRA as it is not that of TES and client, but that of independent 
contractor. In a pre-arbitration minute, the legal issue before the CCMA was crisply 
identified as follows - ‘Whether C-Force is a TES as defined in the LRA, and 
whether C-Force for reward provided to CHEP, the services of the 21 
employees.’50 
The employees on the other hand argued that C-Force is a TES as contemplated 
by section 198 of the LRA. In considering the issue, the CCMA concluded that the 
relationship between CHEP and C-Force is determined by the actual relationship 
between them as opposed to the contractual one. The CCMA concluded that 
factually, the 201 employees were employed by C-Force acting as a TES as 
described in section 198(1)(a) and (b), consequently CHEP was bound by the 
provisions of section 198A(3) and (5) of the LRA.51 
Dissatisfied with the CCMA’s decision, CHEP took the matter on review at the 
LC. The LC was required to interpret the definition of a TES as it appeared in the 
LRA in order to determine whether C-Force fell within the contemplation of section 
198 of the LRA. In relation to the definition of TES under section 198(1)  and (2) of 
the LRA, the LC had to determine the following - (a) whether C-Force provided 
CHEP with ‘other services’; (b) these persons ‘performed work for CHEP’; and (c) 
these persons were remunerated by C-Force.52    
The LC held that the requirement of providing persons to ‘perform work for’ a client 
means that these persons become part of the client’s organisation to pursue the 
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client’s purpose or business. These persons will not be involved or associated in a 
common purpose with the TES in the conduct of the TES’s business. For a person 
providing or procuring employees to be a TES, this element must be present. The 
persons procured should not contribute to the running of the TES’s business, their 
contribution to the TES business is only as far as they are a commodity.53  The LC 
concluded that C-Force cannot be regarded as a TES if it did not provide or 
procure the 201 employees for reward to CHEP. Having considered the terms of 
the SLA between CHEP and C-Force, it became apparent that C-Force was 
rewarded a fee for every pallet repaired and not for a fee for the labour provided 
by the 201 employees.         
The court noted that in the triangular nature of the relationship between a TES, a 
client and placed workers, the TES normally provides human resources related 
services such as remunerating the placed workers, whereas the client conducts 
the day to day management of the placed employees and determine their working 
conditions. The TES merely plays an administrative function and is a third party 
that merely delivers the employees to the client.54 The court found that these 
elements were not present in the relationship between CHEP, C Force and the 
201 employees. There was no evidence that CHEP had any control over the 201 
employees or that the employees were not contributing to the business of C-Force.  
It was also apparent that CHEP was not paying a fee to C-Force for the labour 
procured by the 201 employees, but a fee per item repaired by C-Force using the 
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201 employees.55  Accordingly, the LC reviewed and set aside the decision of the 
CCMA as incorrect and unreasonable.56     
It appears from the CHEP South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Shardlow N.O and others  
decision that the point of departure of whether a person is a TES or an 
independent contractor lies in the definition of TES in the LRA as well as a 
consideration of the nature of the triangular relationship between the TES, client 
and placed workers.57 For a person to be a TES, they must procure or provide 
persons to another in exchange for a fee for the labour of the persons procured. 
The persons so procured must be integrated in the client’s organisation and not in 
that of the TES. They must work for the client and not the TES. The value they add 
to a TES’s business should be that of a commodity as opposed to that of an 
employee rendering services to the business of the TES.58 It appears from the 
CHEP decision that in the absence of these factors, a TES relationship is unlikely 
to exist and thus section 198 of the LRA will not find application.            
Unlike TES, outsourcing service providers offer services that the client would most 
likely be unable to perform themselves or would not be able to perform effectively 
due to a lack of skills and/or equipment. As these functions require specific skill 
sets and equipment, those hired by outsourcing service providers cannot be easily 
replaced.59 The service provider/outsourcing practice is largely popular in cleaning 
and security services. Most companies/organisations usually outsource these 
services because of the skill and equipment usually required for the proper 
rendering of these services. In outsourcing arrangements, the employees are 
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57 Ibid, para 22. 
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contributing to the business of the independent contractor and are not merely 
commodities.    
In this dissertation the focus is on the labour brokering practice and not the 
practice of outsourcing of services/independent contractors. The understanding of 
the distinction between the two concepts is thus fundamentally important for 
purposes of this dissertation.  
2.4  A Fictional Practical Example of the TES practice – Demonstrating 
TES Shortfalls   
As stipulated in the preceding paragraphs, the introduction of the TES practice 
created a very complex triangular relationship which brings a third party to the 
normal traditional employment relationship which only included an employer and 
an employee. It is evident from the preceding paragraphs that the complexities of 
the triangular nature of the relationship presented our legislature with difficulties in 
ensuring adequate regulation of the practice in South Africa, even in the LRA of 
the South African Constitutional dispensation.60   
Below I demonstrate, by way of a practical fictional example and with reference to 
case law some of the shortcomings of the TES practice under the LRA prior to the 
introduction of the LRAA.    
Example 
Star Services (Pty) Ltd ("Star Services") enters into a service level agreement 
with MTN. In terms of the Agreement, Star Services will procure MTN with 20 call 
centre agents to assist MTN at its call centre in Claremont.61 In return, MTN shall 
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pay Star Services R200 000 a month for a period of five years. MTN already has 
30 permanently employed call centre agents who each earn R10 000 per month 
plus commission. Star Services however remunerates the 20 placed call centre 
agents R5000 a month and they are not entitled to any commission. Three years 
into the Agreement, MTN advises Star Services that it is going through financial 
challenges and will only be needing 10 call centre agents for a fee of R100 000 a 
month. Star Services and MTN amend their agreement to reflect these changes. 
MTN advises Star Services of the 10 agents they would like to retain for the 
duration of the SLA. Star Services advises the other 10 agents that they will no 
longer be needed at the MTN call centre and Star Services will look to place them 
with one of their other clients who may need call centre agents. Seven months 
later, the 10 agents have not been placed by Star Services and have been 
unemployed since leaving MTN.                           
This fictional scenario in nutshell describes how the triangular relationship in the 
TES practice operates. Star Services is the TES, MTN is the client and the 20 call 
centre agents are the placed workers to provide labour to MTN as the client of the 
TES. Notably in this scenario, Star Services is responsible for remunerating these 
placed employees and is remunerating them at a significantly lower rate than the 
call centre agents employed by MTN doing the same work. The placed call centre 
agents are also not entitled to receive any commission for the labour provided. 
Furthermore, when MTN no longer wanted the other 10 call centre agents, it 
simply informed Star Services and they were removed. There was no protection 
afforded to them as far as job security with MTN or Star Services is concerned.62   
 
62 Harvey S ‘Labour brokers and workers’ rights: Can they co-exis?’ (2011) SALJ 100 p.110; see also 





The above demonstrates some of the fundamental challenges that the introduction 
of the TES practice brought to the labour market in South Africa.63 Even though it 
was regulated by the LRA prior to the introduction of the LRAA, the regulations did 
not provide adequate protection to the placed workers involved in this triangular 
relationship. At times, the workers would find themselves uncertain as to who their 
true employer is between the TES and its client. These workers would be 
subjected to exploitation for cheap labour, and received lower wages compared to 
the client's employees performing the same or similar work.64 The placed workers 
were also excluded from joining trade unions and participating in collective 
bargaining with the client.65  The right to participate in collective bargaining is a 
constitutional right afforded to everyone which these placed workers were 
deprived in the labour brokering practice.66 These are some of the misnomers that 
led to the call for the LRA to be amended to afford adequate protection to these 
employees who were considered vulnerable and susceptible to exploitation.  
In the above practical example, the 10 placed workers that were effectively 
dismissed by MTN cannot bring a claim against MTN because MTN is not their 
employer.67  This principle was confirmed in the CCMA case of April v Workforce 
 
63 Nape v ITNCS 2010 31 ILJ 2120 (LC) 74 Act 75 of 1997- In this case the client requested that the 
employee be removed from the client’s premises after the TES employee had forwarded an offensive 
email to another employee using one of Nissans’ (the client’s) computer. The labour broker removed 
the employee from the client’s premises and did not find alternative employment for the employee. 
The employee thereafter filed an application for unfair dismissal against the labour broker. The labour 
broker argued that it did not dismiss the employee and that it was only following its client’s 
instructions. The court held that it was not up to the labour broker to argue that it was powerless and 
had to comply with the demands of the client. The court held that the labour broker had several 
options where the client demanded that the employee be removed without good reason. 
64 Benjamin P, et al “Regulatory Impact Assessment of Selected Provisions of the: Labour Relations 
Amendment Bill 2010, Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Bill 2010, Employment Equity 
Amendment Bill 2010 and Employment Services Bill 2010. A Report prepared for the Department of 
Labour and the Presidency” (2010) pg. 17-19.   
65 Botes A “The history of labour hire in Namibia: a Lesson to South Africa.” (2013) 16(2) PER 506 
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66 The right is provided for in s18 of the Constitution and s4 of the LRA.   
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Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd where it was held that a client of a TES cannot be held 
liable for any unfair conduct by the client towards the workers since it is (client) is 
not the employer of the placed workers but the TES is.68  Therefore, an employee 
involved in the TES practice cannot bring a claim of unfair dismissal or of unfair 
labour practice against the client but can only bring such claims against the TES 
as the employer. This is so because the LRA stipulates that in labour brokering 
arrangements, the TES is the employer of the employees, nowhere does it refer to 
the client being an employer.69  
The LRA only makes provisions for the TES and the client to be joint and severally 
liable under specified and limited circumstances, i.e. when there is a breach of a 
collective agreement or binding arbitration award regulating terms and conditions 
of employment etc.70  There is no legal right provided to the placed workers to 
directly bring a claim against the client for breach of employment conditions, unfair 
labour practices or unfair dismissals.71 Notably, the LRA did not make provisions 
for the client to be held liable for unfair labour practices perpetrated by the client to 
the placed workers. Even the provisions of joint and several liability provided a 
protection to the client in that, only when the TES is found in breach and an order 
or ruling is issued against it (TES) can it be enforced against the client. For some 
reason, the LRA elected not to impose joint liability to the client and the TES in 
cases of unfair labour practices and unfair dismissals.  
 
68 April v Workforce Group Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a The Workforce Group 2005 ILJ 2224 (CCMA). See 
also National Union of Metalworkers of SA v SA Five Engineering (Pty) Ltd 2007 ILJ 1290 (LC). 
69 Benjamin 2010 ILJ 850.   
70 See section 198(4) (a)-(c) of the LRA. 
71 Pienaar v Tony Cooper & Associates [1995] 16 ILJ 192 (IC); see also Qwabe & others and 





From a practical consideration, it does not make sense for the client to bear no 
responsibility or liability whatsoever when it comes to these issues since the 
placed workers generally operated on the client's premises, under the supervision 
and direction of the client, worked according to the demands of the clients and 
often worked together with permanent employees of the client doing the same 
work but earning significantly less than them.72 The TES is often not involved in 
the daily operations of the workers, with its only involvement being remunerating 
the workers on their pay day and exercising discipline over them on the instruction 
of the client.  
The lack of recognition of any joint liability for unfair dismissals and unfair labour 
practices between the TES and its client towards the placed workers is one of the 
main causes that created loopholes for the client and the TES to be able to exploit 
the placed workers. This is one of the issues that the introduction of the LRAA 
sought to address.    
2.5  The TES and the client should have been considered joint employers 
by the LRA from inception.   
If we consider substance over form, it is evident that the client should have been 
considered as one of the employers in the triangular relationship from inception. 
Although a statutory employment relationship was recognised by the LRA between 
the placed workers and the TES, it cannot be denied that the interaction of the 
placed workers and the client indicated the existence of an employment 
 





relationship between them. The client in this tripartite relationship exercise control 
over these employees daily and they form part of the client's organisation.73  
It would have been more prudent in my view for the legislature to have considered 
both the TES and the client to be the joint employers of the placed workers from 
the beginning of the triangular relationship. The fact that the client is not 
considered an employer or is held jointly liable for unfair dismissals and unfair 
labour practices for at least three months in the triangular relationship, is in my 
view at odds with spirit and purpose of the LRA considering that the interaction 
and the factual relationship between the client and the placed workers is indicative 
of the existence of an employment relationship from inception.   The failure to hold 
both the client and TES accountable for unfair dismissals and labour practices as 
employers created a loophole for organisations to exploit the vulnerable workers.     
In my view there is no rationale for the LRA to have come to this controversial 
election. The ILO Employment Relationship Recommendations of 2006 mandates 
member states, of which South Africa is one of them, to prevent the disguise of 
employment relationships when they are used to evade employer obligations and 
to deprive employees of their protection.74  It is evident in this regard that the LRA 
was never amended  to heed to this call. The LRA should have at least, 
considered the client the true employer of the placed workers by virtue of the 
factual reality in the interaction between the client and the placed workers.   
 
73 S 200A of the LRA establishes a presumption to the effect that a person who works under the 
supervision and control of another person is provided with tools of the trade and forms part of 
the other person's organisation is an employee of that person.  This is also in accordance with 
common-law tests developed by the courts.  See in this regard Smit v Workmen's Compensation 
Commissioner 1979 1 SA 51 (A) and South African Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie 1999 
ILJ 585 (LAC). 
74 Department of International Relations and Cooperation Republic of South Africa 2004 
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Considering both the TES and the client as employers would have, from inception, 
avoided any loopholes for exploitations in the TES practice.  In cases of unfair 
treatment by either the TES or the client, the placed employee/s would have an 
election to bring a claim against any of the two, who would in turn be held liable 
jointly for the wrong doing irrespective of who between the two of them had 
perpetrated the unfair treatment against the employee/s concerned. The client and 
the TES would have equal rights and responsibilities towards the employees. 
Under those circumstances it would be up to the TES and the client on how they 
choose to regulate issues of joint and several liability between them in their SLA in 
respect of the placed employees.       
2.6  The introduction of the LRAA   
The shortcomings of the LRA gave rise to a call to introduce new amendments to 
the legislation that would address these shortcomings. It was only towards the end 
of 2010 that the Minister of Labour at the time proposed amendments to the LRA 
with the intention of submitting such proposals for a debate at the National 
Economic Development Labour Council (NEDLAC).75 NEDLAC is an almost 
unique statutory body enabling labour, business and other constituencies of civil 
society to participate directly in the formulation of policy and law before it is 
presented to Parliament.76 After robust debates on the proposed bill at NEDLAC, it 
was finally submitted to Cabinet in March 2012 and was later approved for 
submission to parliament.77  
 
75Botes A. ‘The history of labour hire in Namibia: a lesson to South Africa.’ (2013) 16(1) PER 505 
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The bill received strong opposition from businesses across the whole country, this 
was because businesses believed the proposed amendments would bring too 
much restriction to the labour brokering practice.78  The Bill was approved and 
signed by the President into law on 18 August 2014 and is now known as the 
LRAA.79 The LRAA came in operation with effect from 1 January 2015 and 
introduced the intended amendments. These amendments now form part of the 
LRA. Some of these amendments (particularly in section 198A) introduced several 
protections for employees employed through TES. This is because the LRA 
previously, as demonstrated above, afforded very little protection to employees 
involved in the triangular relationship.  
As a result of the inadequate protection, many employers used the gap in the law 
to exploit these vulnerable employees.  As part of this practice, employees would 
be placed at a client's premises for many years and when the SLA between the 
TES and the client terminates, the employees would often be left with no 
protection for job security and no remedies to assist them in cases of unfair 
dismissals.80 The issue of job security was one of the aims that sought to be 
achieved by the LRAA, as well as protecting these employees from low wages and 
inferior conditions of employment. 
From the start, the practice of TES in South Africa was controversial and was 
actively opposed by many, particularly employee unions and federations who saw 
it as a practice that was akin to slavery. Since the beginning of this practice, the 
COSATU and NACTU has always been oppositional to it and actively contested 
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for the complete legislative ban of this practice in South Africa.81 COSATU and 
NACTU argued that the TES practice continued to perpetuate the systematic 
oppression of black people as vulnerable employees under the apartheid regime.82 
They argued that under the old regime workers had no rights in the workplace, 
with legislation and practices such as the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 
excluding African workers from the legal definition of an “employee” and the 
practices of migrant labour systems, pass laws and Bantustans which sought to 
control black labour in the South African society.83  
The LRA and other labour legislation were enacted to represent the country's 
formal commitment and foundations for reversing the apartheid labour market 
regime, in line with obligations arising from then new Constitutional democratic 
dispensation. They argue that the TES practice goes against this commitment and 
should be banned completely and entirely. COSATU commented extensively to 
the proposed Bill leading up to the conclusion of the LRAA when it was published 
in the Government Gazette for public comment and they made various submission 
to Parliament calling for the complete ban of the TES practice. However, 
notwithstanding the strong opposition, as indicated above, the Bill was approved 
into law and became operative on 1 January 2015.     
One of the significant changes brought by the amendments was the introduction of 
section 198A which brought additional protection to employees involved in the 
triangular relationship. Section 198 of the LRA regulates temporary employment 
services in general. Subsection 2 of this provision provides that – 
 







"A person whose services have been procured for or provided to a 
client by a temporary employment service is the employee of that 
temporary employment service, and the temporary employment 
service is that person's employer" 
Section 198(2) therefore does not require an employment contract to exist 
between the TES and the placed workers. Once the employees are procured to 
provide services to a client of the TES, the employees automatically become 
employees of the TES. It is therefore considered to be a statutory employment 
relationship i.e. an employment relationship that exists by operation of law.84 
Section 198(3) expressly provides that independent contractors are excluded from 
the application of section 198. In other words, independent contractors cannot be 
classed as employees of a TES. This points to the importance of understanding of 
the distinction between TES and outsourcing as illustrated in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
Section 198(4) and 198(4A) of the LRA deal with joint and several liability of the 
TES and client vis-a-viz the TES employees. The TES and the client will be jointly 
and severally liable in limited circumstances, i.e. if the TES contravenes – a 
collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council that regulates terms and 
conditions of employment; binding arbitration award; the BCEA; or a sectoral 
determination under the BCEA. In these circumstances, the TES employee may 
institute proceedings against either the TES or the client or both. Notably, there is 
no joint liability in disputes of unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices. 
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At this stage, it is necessary to consider section 198A of the LRA as it creates 
several additional protections for TES employees. It is the interpretation of this 
section that has sparked an intense debate in the South Africa labour 
jurisprudence. It is important to note, at the outset, that the provisions of section 
198A only apply to employees earning below the BCEA earnings threshold 
(currently set at R205 433.30 per annum), i.e. lower-paid employees.85 These 
employees are often considered to be vulnerable employees involved in 
precarious employment and therefore deserving of additional protections.86  
Section 198A introduces additional protection for these lower-paid employees. 
This provision essentially provides that a TES employee, earning below the 
threshold and who is not engaged in 'temporary services' will be 'deemed' to be 
the employee of the client for purposes of the LRA only. A TES employee will only 
be engaged in 'temporary services' in the following circumstances –  
(a) if the period of service does not exceed three months; (b) the work is 
performed as a 'substitute for an employee who is temporarily absent'; 
or (c) the work falls into a category or is conducted over a period 
deemed to be a temporary service a bargaining council agreement or 
sectoral determination.87 
The introduced additional protection is intended to ensure that temporary 
employees are not subjected to exploitation and discrimination by being subjected 
to less favourable conditions of employment than employees of the client. There is 
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a proven history in South Africa for companies who used employees involved in 
the TES practice as a form of cheap labour.88 These additional protections 
introduced by the LRAA seek to introduce a substantial amount of regulation of 
this practice with the aim of limiting the potential exploitation of the placed workers.    
Section 198A(3)(b)(i) provides that for purposes of the LRA, after the three-month 
of being placed with the client, the TES employee performing temporary services 
is "deemed to be the employee of that client and the client is deemed to be the 
employer."89 The TES employees will become employed by the client on an 
indefinite basis.90 The only exception to this is if it can be shown that the TES 
employee was employed on a fixed-term contract (that meets the requirements of 
section 198B). Since coming into operation, section 198A(3)(b) has become widely 
known as "the deeming provision".  The deeming provision gave rise to many 
questions regarding its interpretation. With the most controversial question being – 
'Once the deeming provision is triggered, does it give rise to a dual 
employment relationship where the TES employees are deemed to 
be employed by both the TES and the client? Or does it create a sole 
employment relationship between the employees and the client?" 
2.7 Conclusion  
The following two chapters will be focusing on the discussions and analysis of the 
case law that dealt with the interpretation of the deeming provisions. This 
interpretation sparked a very interesting debate in South African labour law, 
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particularly in relation to the nature of the triangular relationship considering the 
deeming provisions. Two schools of thoughts emerged from the judicial scrutiny of 
the deeming provisions, with one school taking the view that upon the application 
of the deeming provisions a dual employment relationship is formed with both the 
TES and the client becoming joint employers of the placed workers with equal 
rights and obligations towards the employees. This interpretation argued that the 
deeming provisions created a statutory employment relationship between the 
client and the employees which came into operation by operation of law.  
The other school of thought favoured the interpretation that once the deeming 
provision is triggered, the client becomes the sole employer of the placed workers 
and the TES falls away as it no longer serves a purpose in the triangular 
relationship. However, the relationship between the TES and the client is retained 
with only the employees being taken over by the client from the TES.91 In chapter 
three, we explore in detail the meaning of the dual and sole employment 
interpretation as demonstrated in case law.             
 





CHAPTER 3 -  THE DUAL AND SOLE EMPLOYMENT INTERPRETATION  
3.1  Introduction   
The interpretation of the deeming provision first received judicial scrutiny at the 
CCMA less than five months from the commencement date of the LRAA.92 In this 
case, Assign Services (Pty) Limited (Assign) was the TES as defined in section 
198(1) of the LRA whilst Krost Shelving was the client with whom workers were 
placed to provide temporary service for its benefit.93  
In this case the CCMA was tasked with providing clarify as to the meaning to be 
conferred to the deeming provision considering the parties’ contestation that the 
deeming provision has two possible interpretations.   
3.2  The Factual background to the Assign Services judgement  
Prior to the coming into operation of the LRAA, Assign had placed 22 workers with 
its client, Krost Shelving and Racking (Pty) Ltd (Krost), for the purposes of 
providing labour to Krost, a company that is involved in the business of offering 
storage solutions to its clients. Krost had in addition to the 22 placed workers, 
about 130 other employees who were employed by it.94 The 130 employees were 
managed and paid by Krost for their services and were therefore, for all intents 
and purposes Krost's employees. The 22 workers were placed by Assign to 
provide additional labour to Krost and Assign received a fee from Krost in 
exchange for the labour provided by the 22 placed workers. The 22 placed 
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workers were members of the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa 
(NUMSA) at the time of placement.95     
The dispute arose when NUMSA alleged that as of 1 April 2015, the placed 
workers had been placed with Krost for a period in excess of three months and 
had therefore became employees of Krost as a client of Assign in light of section 
198A(3)(b) of the LRAA.96 NUMSA argued that because by 1 April 2015 the 
operation of the deeming provision had been triggered, Assign had fallen out of 
the triangle relationship and only Krost remained as the sole employer of the 22 
placed workers. It was common cause between the parties that the 22 workers 
were placed with Krost to provide labour on a full-time basis and that their 
placement occurred prior to 1 January 2015, the commencement date of the 
deeming provisions.97  
 In light of this allegation, Assign referred this dispute to the CCMA in terms of 
section 198D(1) of the LRA,98 which allows the CCMA to determine disputes about 
the interpretation or application of section 198A of the LRAA. Assign's arguments 
was that the deeming provision must be interpreted to mean that after the three 
month's placement period has been triggered, in this case since 1 April 2015, both 
Assign and Krost became dual employers of the 22 placed workers, with Assign 
being the employer for all intents and purposes whilst Krost was deemed to also 
be an employer for purposes of the LRA only.99 This, Assign referred to as the 
dual employment position/interpretation. NUMSA opposed this referral and 
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maintained its argument that the deeming provision should be interpreted to mean 
that the client, in this case Krost, became the sole employer of the 22 placed 
workers with effect from 1 April 2015. This they referred to as the sole employment 
position/interpretation.100  
This matter was before the CCMA as a stated case wherein both parties agreed 
on issues that were common cause and those that were in dispute as well as the 
issue that the CCMA had to determine, namely being the interpretation to be 
conferred to the deeming provision.101  Krost as the client, was joined and cited as 
an interested party in the proceedings but did not oppose the proceeding, instead 
Krost waived its rights to participate and filed a notice that it will abide by the 
decision of the CCMA.102  
This meant that should the CCMA find in favour of Assign, Krost would be deemed 
an employer of the 22 workers for purposes of the LRA only. This meant that the 
employment relationship between Assign and the placed workers would remain 
intact for all intense and purposes and that Krost would be considered an 
employer only in so far as the employment rights and responsibility flowing from 
the LRA are concerned. For example, the placed workers would be entitled to 
bring unfair dismissals and unfair labour practice disputes against Krost as their 
LRA employer without the need to join Assign in the dispute. Even where the 
commercial agreement between Assign and Krost terminate, Krost would remain 
an employer of the placed workers. 
 
100 Ibid, para 3.3. 
101 Ibid, para 2.1 and 3.1. 





Furthermore, Krost would be obliged to provide the placed workers with terms and 
conditions of employment, that are no less favourable to those enjoyed by 
comparable indefinite employees employed by it. On the other hand, should 
NUMSA succeed, Krost would accept that it had become the sole employer of the 
22 workers with effect from 1 April 2019.  
3.3  Assign’s legal submissions at the CCMA – Dual Employment 
Interpretation  
The arguments commenced with both parties relying on their understanding of the 
ordinary meaning of the word "deemed" in section 198A(3)(b) of the LRA. Assign 
as the Applicant and favouring the dual employment position argued with 
reference to case law that the expression "deemed" has no technical or uniform 
connotation and that its meaning and effect must be ascertained from the context 
in which it is used and its ordinary common construction. In support of this 
approach, Assign referred to the authority of R v Haffejee103 to argue that in 
interpreting the expression "deemed", the aim, scope and objectives of the LRA 
must be considered in order to determine the sense of section 198A(3)(b).  
In summary, Assign submitted that the word "deemed" lacked a uniform meaning 
and in order to understand its meaning and effect, one must consider the context 
in which the word is used in the LRA as well as the purpose of section 198 and 
198A of the LRA.104  Assign argued that from an overall contextual perspective, 
there was nothing in section 198 or 198A that supported the sole employment 
position. This is so because nowhere did the two provisions reflect a decision by 
the legislature to ban the use of TES practice, whether because of the deeming 
 
103 R v Haffejee and Another 1945 AD 345.   





provision or otherwise.105  The two provisions should be read holistically and not in 
isolation. 
Furthermore, Assign submitted that although it is clear from the deeming provision 
that it was the only employer of the placed workers for the first three months of 
placement,106 however when the deeming provision were triggered on 1 April 2015 
it did not serve to terminate the commercial agreement between Assign and Krost, 
nor did it serve to terminate the contractual employment relationship between 
Assign and the placed workers.107 Assign argued that when the deeming 
provisions are triggered, they in effect create greater protection for the placed 
workers by making both Assign and Krost dual employers, with Krost being 
deemed an employer for purposes of the LRA only. Assign submitted that, in terms 
of this dual employment position, the placed workers are entitled in terms of 
section198(4A) (the joint and several liability provision)108 to institute proceedings 
against either Assign or Krost, or both and that they may enforce any order or 
award made against Assign or Krost, against either of them.109            
3.4 NUMSA’s legal submission at the CCMA – Sole Employment 
Interpretation  
 
105 Ibid, para 4.4. 
106 Section 198(2) of the LRA provides that a 'person whose services have been procured for or 
provided to a client by a temporary employment service is the employee of that temporary 
employment service, and the temporary employment service is that person's employer'. 
107Assign Services v Krost supra (note 15),para 4.4. 
108 If the client of a temporary employment service is jointly and severally liable in terms of section 
198(4) or is deemed to be the employer of an employee in terms of section 198A(3)(b)- (a) the 
employee may institute proceedings against either the temporary employment service or the client 
or both the temporary employment service and the client; (b) a labour inspector acting in terms of 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act may secure and enforce compliance against the temporary 
employment service or the client as if it were the employer, or both; and (c) any order or award made 
against a temporary employment service or client in terms of this subsection may be enforced against 
either. 





In opposition to Assign’s legal submissions, NUMSA argued, also with reference to 
case law,110 that the word "deemed" is often used in legislation in a very loose 
sense and therefore could easily be substituted with the word "is". NUMSA argued 
that, effectively that the word "deemed" as used in section 198A(3)(b)(i) created a 
legal fiction that once the deeming provision is triggered, the client (in this case 
Krost), is the sole employer of the placed workers.111  In other words, NUMSA 
argued, the word "deemed" as used under section 198A of the LRA carried the 
same meaning as the word "is". Therefore, section 198A(3)(b)(i) created a legal 
fiction that the client is the employer of the placed workers after the three months 
of placement.112 NUMSA  submitted that the reference made by Assign to section 
198(4A) does not create any new liabilities for any of the parties concerned, in that 
the provision merely provides an opportunity for an employee to institute 
proceedings against a party that is liable and that this provision applied to all 
workers placed with a client, including those who have been placed shorter than 
the three months contemplated by the deeming provision.113     
NUMSA further argued that although the deeming provision does not expressly 
state that the client becomes the employer, the wording of section 198A(3)(b)(ii), 
when it reads " subject to the provisions of section 198B, employed on an 
indefinite basis by the client" supports the sole employment interpretation.114 
NUMSA also submitted that in relation to the pay parity provision created in terms 
 
110 S v Rosenthall 1980 (1) SA 65 A; and R v County Council of Norfolk 65 (1891) QB division. 
111 Ibid, para 4.2. 
112 Assign Services v Krost supra (note 15), para 4.2. 
113 Ibid, para 4.7. 
114 For the purposes of this Act, an employee- (a)  performing a temporary service as contemplated 
in subsection (1) for the client is the employee of the temporary employment services in terms of 
section 198(2); or (b) not performing such temporary service for the client is- (i)  deemed to be the 
employee of that client and the client is deemed to be the employer; and (ii)  subject to the provisions 





of section 198A(5),115 the legislature actually intends to create better employment 
conditions for the placed workers than those enjoyed by them under the TES and 
therefore a simple transfer of employment in terms of section 197 of the LRA 
would not suffice.116  NUMSA continued to argue that a dual employment 
interpretation will cause confusion, uncertainty and prejudice to vulnerable 
employees because more often employees involved in the TES practice get 
confused as to whether they are employed by the TES or the client. It was further 
argued that the amendments were introduced to provide clarity to these 
employees on who their true employer is.117 The sole employment interpretation 
will therefore provide clarity and certainty to these employees, as opposed to the 
dual employment interpretation that will leave them as confused as before.  
NUMSA further submitted that the dual employment interpretation is nothing but 
an artificial construction which gives rise to immense scope for abuse, this is so 
because the placed workers are with the client often for an indefinite basis, but the 
TES is regarded as the employer merely because it pays the salaries. This 
construction does not make sense having regard to the objectives of the LRAA, 
which is to eliminate abuse and ensure job security.118                
3.5  The CCMA’s interpretation of the deeming provision – Sole 
Employment Interpretation  
 
115 An employee deemed to be an employee of the client in terms of subsection (3)(b) must be treated 
on the whole not less favourably than an employee of the client performing the same or similar work, 
unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment. 
116 Assign Services v Krost supra (note 15), para 4.8. see also section 198A (5) of the LRA "An 
employee deemed to be an employee of the client in terms of subsection (3)(b) must be treated on 
the whole not less favourably than an employee of the client performing the same or similar work, 
unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment".  
117 Ibid, para 5.11. 
118 Ibid, para 5.11. see also Benjamin, ‗To regulate or to ban? Controversies over temporary 
employment agencies in South Africa and Namibia ‘, in Malherbe and Sloth-Nielsen (eds), Labour 





In considering both parties submissions, the Commissioner held that, when 
interpreting any provision of the LRA, one is obliged to have regard to the primary 
objective of the Act as a whole.119  An interpretation that gives effect to the primary 
objectives of the LRA must therefore be preferred.120 In order to achieve this task, 
the Commissioner had regard to the Explanatory Memorandum of the LRAA in 
order to ascertain its objectives. In light of this, the Commissioner noted that the 
amendments to section 198 are intended to address certain challenges with the 
labour brokering practice and to prevent abusive practices associated with this 
practice.121 The Commissioner pertinently highlighted that the main aim of the 
amendments is to restrict the employment of more vulnerable, lower paid workers 
by TES to situations of genuine and relevant temporary work and to introduce 
protective measures to workers involved in this practice.122  
The Commissioner further noted that in terms of the Explanatory Memorandum, 
section 198A was introduced to afford protection to the most vulnerable 
employees who earn below the threshold prescribed by the BCEA, and provides 
that such employees are employees of the TES for purposes of the LRA only if 
they are employed to perform genuine temporary work.123 If the employees are not 
performing temporary work, they are deemed for purposes of the LRA to be 
employees of the client and not the TES. In concluding his findings, the 
Commissioner opined that the deeming provisions should be interpreted similarly 
to the law applicable to adoption of children. In adoption cases, the Commissioner 
noted, the adoptive parent acquires full parental rights to the child whilst the 
 
119 Bid, para 5.2. 
120 Assign Services v Krost supra (n15), para 5. See also Chirwa v Transnet 2008 (4) SA 367 (CC). 
121 Ibid, para 5.4, 5.5.  
122 Ibid, para 5.4 





biological parents are completely removed from the picture.124 There is no dual 
parental relationship recognised by the law. The Commissioner noted that this is 
deemed to be in the best interest of the child as it leaves less confusion to the 
child as to who its parents are.125  
Equally in the interpretation of the deeming provision, the dual employment 
interpretation creates several problems as uncertainties would remain present. For 
example, it is not clear which employer would maintain the right to discipline and 
whose disciplinary code the placed employees would be bound by, and which 
employer would be bound in cases of reinstatement.126  
The Commissioner dismissed Assign’s argument that section 198(4A) does not 
apply joint and several liability in terms of section 198(3)(b)(i) but only in terms of 
section 198(4)127 and that this seek to create dual employment. The Commissioner 
found that the fact that an employee has an election on who to institute 
proceedings against in the enforcement of awards does not, in its plain reading, 
support the dual employment interpretation.128   
He concluded that, the legislature did not intend to completely ban the operation of 
the TES practice, but only sought to restrict and regulate the industry by affording 
better protection to the vulnerable employees involved in this practice. The TES 
are not banned because the commercial relationship between the client and the 
 
124 Ibid, para 5.12. 
125 Assign Services v Krost supra (n15), para 5.12. 
126 Ibid, para 5.13. 
127 The temporary employment service and the client are jointly and severally liable if the temporary 
employment service, in respect of any of its employees, contravenes - (a) a collective agreement 
concluded in a bargaining council that regulates terms and conditions of employment;  (b) a binding 
arbitration award that regulates terms and conditions of employment; (c) the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act; or (d) a sectoral determination made in terms of the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act. 





TES can continue, the only thing that changes is that the placed workers become 
solely the employees of the client for the purpose of the LRA after the three 
months period has lapsed.129 This is so because placement that is longer than 
three months is no longer regarded by the LRA as temporary service. And if they 
are not employed to perform temporary services, they are deemed for purposes of 
the LRA to be employees of the client and not that of the TES.  
The Commissioner consequently ruled that the sole employment interpretation is 
the one that is supported by the primary objectives of the LRAA as evident in the 
Explanatory Memorandum. Consequently, after the three months period and with 
effect from 1 April 2015, the placed workers were deemed employees of Krost on 
an indefinite basis for purposes of the LRA and Krost became the sole 
employer.130  
Interestingly, in his award the Commissioner made no pronouncement on what 
terms and conditions the placed workers would be employed by the client after the 
deeming provision has been triggered. The Commissioner's finding meant that the 
TES was, as a consequence of the sole employment interpretation, no longer 
considered an employer of the placed workers after the lapsing of the three 
months period and was released from any employer obligations it owed to the 
placed workers.  
The Commissioner was satisfied that the sole employment interpretation is the one 
that provided greater protection to the vulnerable class of employees as 
contemplated in section 198A(3)(b) of the LRA.      
 
129 Ibid, para 5.17. 





3.6  The Labour Court’s interpretation of the Deeming Provision – Dual 
Employment Interpretation   
Dissatisfied with the CCMA ruling, Assign took this matter to the LC to be reviewed 
in terms of section 145 of the LRA131 on the grounds that the Commissioner had 
committed a material error of law and a gross irregularity which resulted in an 
unreasonable award. In considering the facts to this dispute, Brassey AJ noted 
that NUMSA had conceded in its heads of arguments that, although Krost is 
deemed the employer after the three months period for purposes of the LRA, the 
contractual relationship between the placed workers and Assign remained in force 
and accepted under cross examination that there is nothing in the LRAA  which 
suggested that the placed workers are deprived of rights and obligations arising 
from their employment contract with Assign after the triggering of the deeming 
provision.132  
This was considered in light of Assign’s submissions that once the deeming 
provision is triggered, Krost became invested with rights and obligations that, by 
operation of the LRA, attach to an employer and, since Assign has in no sense 
been deprived of its status as employer, the two relationships now operated in 
parallel.133 Assign submitted that the contracts of employment between it and the 
placed workers, even after the three months period, remained in force and nothing 
invalidates it, therefore it must be accepted by the Court that the placement of the 
 
131 Any party to a dispute who alleges a defect in any arbitration proceedings under the auspices of 
the Commission may apply to the Labour Court for an order setting aside the arbitration award - (a)  
within six weeks of the date that the award was served on the applicant, unless the alleged defect 
involves the commission of an offence referred to in Part 1 to 4 or section 17, 20 or 21 (in so far as 
it relates to the aforementioned offences) of Chapter 2 of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt 
Activities Act, 2004; or (b) if the alleged defect involves an offence referred to in paragraph (a), within 
six weeks of the date that the applicant discovers such offence. 
132 Assign Services v CCMA supra (n17), para 3 





placed workers with Krost has no bearing on the employment relationship between 
it and the workers and that the employment relationship continues with all the 
rights and obligations flowing from it from the time it was entered into.134     
Having considered the above submissions, Brassey AJ rejected the argument that 
the deeming provision create a sole employment relationship. He found that there 
was nothing in the LRA which suggested that the contractual relationship between 
the TES and the workers came to an end upon the coming into effect of the 
deeming provision, in fact NUMSA had conceded to this.135 The LC found that the 
deeming provision served to augment the contract between the TES and its 
employees and added the client as the party against whom the employees could 
claim their rights in terms of the LRA. Accordingly, it was not a substitution of the 
TES as the old employer, with the client as the new employer.136  
The LC held that there is no reason in principle and in practice why the TES 
should be relieved of its statutory rights and obligations towards the placed 
workers because the client has acquired a parallel set of such rights and 
obligations, there was no reason why a TES should sacrifice its rights and 
obligations towards the placed workers simply on account of the fact that the 
workers have found placement with the client.137 Brassey AJ found that after the 
three months period, two employment relationship exist with the client being added 
in the equation as an additional employer. The two employment relationships 
therefore co-existed at the same time in parallel lines.     
 
134 Ibid, para 5. 
135 Ibid, para 11 and 14. 
136 Ibid, para 14. 





Furthermore, it was also found by the LC that it is the contractual relationship 
between the TES and the workers that gave the TES control over the employees. 
The fact that the workers rendered their labour according to the instruction of the 
client does not necessarily mean that the client is the one in control of the 
employees because the law recognises, as the Bible does that 'No man can serve 
two masters.'138 The source of the control still vests with the TES as the 
contractual employer of the workers and should the TES terminate this relationship 
with the workers, the source of the power of control is gone and the objects of the 
employment relationship become impossible to achieve.139 Unless the client 
concludes a new contract with the workers, its relationship must come to an end 
by operation of supervening impossibility. The LC as per Brassey AJ concluded 
therefore that after the deeming provision was triggered, Krost did not become the 
sole employer, instead both Assign and Krost became employers of the 
employees with the two respective employment relationships being discernible and 
operating in tandem.      
Pursuant to these two findings, it is evident that the LC favoured the dual 
employment interpretation whilst the CCMA favoured the sole employment 
interpretation. These two-interpretation created further confusion and uncertainties 
and sparked further robust debates as to the proper interpretation to be assigned 
to the deeming provision. The LC decision was not the end of this legal debate as 
the matter was referred to the LAC and subsequently to the CC as will be 
discussed in chapter 4 below.   
 
138 Ibid, para 17. 





From a reading of the CCMA award, it is readily apparent that the main thrust for 
the CCMA's favouring of the sole employment interpretation was based on the 
Commissioner's view that the dual employment interpretation would bring 
confusion to the placed workers as they would still be unaware as to who their true 
employer was if the dual employment interpretation is preferred.  
However, it can be argued that an interpretation that favours dual employment 
would bring no confusion to the placed workers at all. This is so because this 
interpretation would entitle the placed worker to bring a claim against either the 
client or the TES or both jointly. Any purported confusion which may be 
occasioned to the placed workers by this interpretation would be immaterial and 
nonprejudicial to them as it broadens the scope of their ability to bring claims 
against their employer/s. 
3.7  Conclusion  
Having considered the LC and the CCMA’s interpretation to the deeming 
provision, what becomes apparent from the CCMA's ruling is that, considerations 
were not given to the impact of the decision to the practical operation of the TES 
practice and its sustenance, instead the Commissioner placed a strong reliance on 
the possibility that the dual employment interpretation would bring confusion to the 
placed workers.  
The Commissioner’s finding that the sole employment interpretation does not ban 
the operation of the TES practice because the commercial agreement between the 
TES and the client is not nullified after the deeming provision is triggered, is in my 
view unsustainable and irrational. This is so because, the mere existence of the 





status as an employer and to receive a fee in exchange for the labour performed 
by the placed workers. The benefit to the client is the receipt of the labour without 
the obligations and liability of a sole employer. If the client becomes the sole 
employer after the three months and take full sole responsibility for all the placed 
workers, logic dictates that the purpose for which the commercial agreement was 
concluded between the client and the TES sees to exist and naturally, the 
agreement would also be terminated by them as it no longer serves its main 
purpose. Although the TES may continue to remunerate the placed workers post 
the deeming and perform other human resources functions, the benefit of this to 
the client is not significant and is likely to impact the fee payable by the client as 
these are functions that the client is in most cases able to do itself.            
It is evident that the LC duly considered these challenges prior to concluding that 
the dual employment interpretation should be favoured. There is no reason why 
the TES should be released of its obligations as an employer after the three 
months, in fact nothing in the LRAA as well as its Explanatory Memorandum 
suggest that the relationship between the TES and the placed workers must 
terminate as soon as the deeming provision is triggered. The logical conclusion 
therefore should be that the relationship between the TES and the placed workers 
survive even after the deeming provision has been triggered.    
Unfortunately, the decision of the LC as per Brassey AJ, of the interpretation of the 
deeming provision only constituted our legal position for a limited period of time 
until it was overturned by the LAC which too favoured the sole employment 
interpretation. In the next chapter we discuss how the LAC and the CC dealt with 
the interpretation of the deeming provision as well as what the current position in 





employment relationship? This question is explored in detail in the following 






CHAPTER 4 -  THE LABOUR APPEAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’      
FINDINGS ON THE INTERPETATION OF THE DEEMING 
PROVISION. 
4.1  The Labour Appeal Court's interpretation of the deeming provision- 
Sole Employment Interpretation  
Assign's celebration of the LC's finding on the interpretation of the deeming 
provision was short lived as NUMSA immediately took the matter on appeal to the 
LAC. The LAC was also tasked to decide on the proper interpretation of the 
deeming provision and the effect thereof. Since this was an appeal, it required the 
LAC to determine whether the dual employment interpretation as ascribed by 
Brassey J in the LC was the correct interpretation in law.  
As did the commissioner at the CCMA, the LAC in tackling this legal conundrum, 
started off by laying down the basic legal principles applicable in interpretations of 
statutes in South African law.140 The LAC per Tlaletsi DJP, referred to and placed 
guidance on section 39(2) of the Constitution141 as well as section 3 of the LRA142 
to emphasise that the purposive interpretation that aims to promote the spirit and 
objectives of the Bill of Rights must be applied when interpreting legislation in 
South Africa.143 Further to this, the LAC expressed that as per section 1 of the 
 
140 NUMSA v Assign Services supra (n19), para 28- 31. 
141 "When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum— (a) must promote the values that 
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must 
consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law. (2) When interpreting any legislation, 
and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. (3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence 
of any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or 
legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill." 
142 Any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions- (a) to give effect to its primary objects; 
(b) in compliance with the Constitution; and (c) in compliance with the public international law 
obligations of the Republic. 
143 NUMSA v Assign Services supra (n19), para 31. See also Natal Joint Pension Fund v Endumeni 





LRA,144 the purpose of the LRA is inter alia to advance economic development, 
social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling 
the primary objects of the LRA.145  
After having laid down the fundamental principles applicable in interpretation of 
statutes, the LAC, with reliance to section 198(1) of the LRA noted that the LRAA 
has given a specific special meaning to ' temporary services', which is to mean 
work for a client by an employee for a period not exceeding three months, or as a 
substitute for an employee of the client who is temporarily absent; or an employee 
who falls into a category of work and for any period of time which is determined to 
be a temporary service by a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining 
council, a sectoral determination or a notice published by the Minister, in 
accordance with the provisions of subsections (6) to (8) of the LRA.146 After having 
identified this special meaning, the LAC found that section 189A(1) places an 
emphasis on the type of services as defined as opposed to the person rendering 
those services. In other words, the focus is on the specific definition of 'temporary 
services' as ascribed by the LRA as opposed to who is rendering those temporary 
services.147  
In unpacking this issue further, the LAC found that if a TES places a worker to 
provide labour to a client in contravention of section 189A(1), in other words for 
 
144 The purpose of this Act is to advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and 
the democratisation of the workplace by fulfilling the primary objects of this Act, which are- (a) to give 
effect to and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 27 of the Constitution; (b)to give 
effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International Labour 
Organisation; (c) to provide a framework within which employees and their trade unions, employers 
and employers' organisations can-  (i) collectively bargain to determine wages, terms and conditions 
of employment and other matters of mutual interest; and  (ii) formulate industrial policy; and  (d) to 
promote-  (i) orderly collective bargaining; (ii) collective bargaining at sectoral level; (iii)employee 
participation in decision-making in the workplace; and (iv) the effective resolution of labour disputes. 
145 NUMSA v Assign Services supra (n17), para 35. 
146 Ibid, para 31. 





longer than three months or not as a substitute for an employee of the client who 
is temporary absent etc; such placed worker is no longer performing temporary 
work as defined, and if they are not performing temporary work they will be 
deemed an employee of the client for an indefinite period subject to sec 198B148 
 
148 (1) - For the purpose of this section, a ‘fixed term contract’ means a contract of employment that 
terminates on- (a) the occurrence of a specified event; (b) the completion of a specified task or 
project; or (c) a fixed date, other than an employee’s normal or agreed retirement age, subject to 
subsection (3).   
(2) - This section does not apply to- (a) employees earning in excess of the threshold prescribed by 
the Minister in terms of section 6(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act; (b) an employer that 
employs less than 10 employees, or that employs less than 50 employees and whose business has 
been in operation for less than two years, unless- (i) the employer conducts more than one business; 
or (ii) the business was formed by the division or dissolution for any reason of an existing business; 
and  (c) an employee employed in terms of a fixed term contract which is permitted by any statute, 
sectoral determination or collective agreement.  
(3) - An employer may employ an employee on a fixed term contract or successive fixed term 
contracts for longer than three months of employment only if- (a) the nature of the work for which the 
employee is employed is of a limited or definite duration; or (b) the employer can demonstrate any 
other justifiable reason for fixing the term of the contract.  
(4) - Without limiting the generality of subsection (3), the conclusion of a fixed term contract will be 
justified if the employee- (a) is replacing another employee who is temporarily absent from work; (b)  
is employed on account of a temporary increase in the volume of work which is not expected to 
endure beyond 12 months; (c) is a student or recent graduate who is employed for the purpose of 
being trained or gaining work experience in order to enter a job or profession; (d) is employed to work 
exclusively on a specific project that has a limited or defined duration; (e) is a non-citizen who has 
been granted a work permit for a defined period; (f) is employed to perform seasonal work; (g) is 
employed for the purpose of an official public works scheme or similar public job creation scheme;  
(h) is employed in a position which is funded by an external source for a limited period; or (i) has 
reached the normal or agreed retirement age applicable in the employer’s business.  
(5) - Employment in terms of a fixed term contract concluded or renewed in contravention of 
subsection (3) is deemed to be of indefinite duration.  
(6) - An offer to employ an employee on a fixed term contract or to renew or extend a fixed term 
contract, must- (a) be in writing; and (b) state the reasons contemplated in subsection (3)(a) or (b). 
 (7)  - If it is relevant in any proceedings, an employer must prove that there was a justifiable reason 
for fixing the term of the contract as contemplated in subsection (3) and that the term was agreed. 
 (8) - (a) An employee employed in terms of a fixed term contract for longer than three months must 
not be treated less favourably than an employee employed on a permanent basis performing the 
same or similar work, unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment. (b) Paragraph (a) 
applies, three months after the commencement of the Labour Relations Amendment Act, 2014, to 
fixed term contracts of employment entered into before the commencement of the Labour Relations 
Amendment Act, 2014.  
(9) - As from the commencement of the Labour Relations Amendment Act, 2014, an employer must 
provide an employee employed in terms of a fixed term contract and an employee employed on a 
permanent basis with equal access to opportunities to apply for vacancies. 
 (10) - (a) An employer who employs an employee in terms of a fixed term contract for a reason 
contemplated in subsection (4)(d) for a period exceeding 24 months must, subject to the terms of 
any applicable collective agreement, pay the employee on expiry of the contract one week’s 
remuneration for each completed year of the contract calculated in accordance with section 35 of the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act. (b) An employee employed in terms of a fixed-term contract, 
as contemplated in paragraph (a), before the commencement of the Labour Relations Amendment 
Act, 2014, is entitled to the remuneration contemplated in paragraph (a) in respect of any period 
worked after the commencement of the said Act. 
 (11) - An employee is not entitled to payment in terms of subsection (10) if, prior to the expiry of the 





and the client will be deemed their employer149 but for the purpose of the LRA 
only. The LAC in following the purposive interpretation of statute approach, found 
that the purpose of the LRAA was to limit the TES practice to situations of genuine 
temporary services. In other words, temporary services were limited only to the 
extent as defined in the LRAA and anything above that would trigger the 
application of the deeming provision which has the effect of making the placed 
workers, employees of the client and vice versa. In supporting this contention, the 
LAC also placed strong reliance on the Explanatory Memorandum150 
accompanying the LRAA as tabled in Parliament in 2012. The Explanatory 
Memorandum provided inter alia that the main thrust of the amendments is to 
restrict the employment of more vulnerable, lower- paid workers by a TES to 
situations of genuine and relevant “temporary work”, and to introduce various 
further measures to protect workers employed in this way.151  
The LAC concluded that there was nothing in the Explanatory Memorandum that 
supported the contention that the dual employment interpretation was intended by 
the legislature. The sole employment interpretation was the one that was 
consonant with the main thrust of the Explanatory Memorandum.152 Furthermore, 
the court found that nothing in the LRAA itself favoured the dual employment 
interpretation and that the protection against unfair dismissal and unfair 
discrimination in the context of s198A should not be interpreted to support this 
interpretation, but should rather be seen as a measure to ensure that placed 
workers, once deemed employees of the client are not treated differently from the 
 
employee with a different employer, which commences at the expiry of the contract and on the same 
or similar terms. 
149 NUMSA v Assign Services supra (n17). 
150 Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2012. 
151 NUMSA v Assign Services, supra (n17), para 38. 





employees employed directly by the client.153  The purpose of these protections in 
the context of s198A is to ensure that the deemed employees are fully integrated 
into the enterprise as employees of the client. 
The LAC further held that, this protection afforded to the placed workers takes into 
consideration the fact that the client is a statutory employer and the relationship 
between them is not one that is a product of negotiation but one that arises by 
operation of law.154  The effect of this, held the LAC, is that the placed workers 
become the employees of the client by operation of law for an indefinite period on 
the same terms and conditions of employment as employees directly employed by 
the client doing the same or similar work.155  
The LAC correctly observed that there is nothing in the LRAA that suggests that 
the contracts of employment of the placed workers are transferred to the client 
after three months or that the client steps into the shoes of the TES similar to 
section 197 of the LRA.156 This would no doubt have supported, perhaps 
 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid, para 40. 
155 Ibid, 40. 
156  In this section and in section 197A - (a)  ‘business’ includes the whole or a part of any business, 
trade, undertaking or service; and (b) ‘transfer’ means the transfer of a business by one employer 
(‘the old employer’) to another employer (‘the new employer’) as a going concern.  
(2) - If a transfer of a business takes place, unless otherwise agreed in terms of subsection (6) -  
(a)     the new employer is automatically substituted in the place of the old employer in respect of all 
contracts of employment in existence immediately before the date of transfer; (b)  all the rights and 
obligations between the old employer and an employee at the time of the transfer continue in force 
as if they had been rights and obligations between the new employer and the employee;(c)  anything 
done before the transfer by or in relation to the old employer, including the dismissal of an employee 
or the commission of an unfair labour practice or act of unfair discrimination, is considered to have 
been done by or in relation to the new employer; and (d) the transfer does not interrupt an employee’s 
continuity of employment, and an employee’s contract of employment continues with the new 
employer as if with the old employer. 
(3) - (a) The new employer complies with subsection (2) if that employer employs transferred 
employees on terms and conditions that are on the whole not less favourable to the employees than 
those on which they were employed by the old employer. (b) Paragraph (a) does not apply to 
employees if any of their conditions of employment are determined by a collective agreement.  
(4) - Subsection (2) does not prevent an employee from being transferred to a pension, provident, 
retirement or similar fund other than the fund to which the employee belonged prior to the transfer, if 





conclusively, that the sole employer interpretation was the intended 
interpretation.157 The LAC however found that similarly, nothing in the LRAA 
stipulated that after the three months period the TES and the client become joint 
employers or that the client is added to the relationship to augment it, thus 
supporting the dual employment interpretation. It is only the purpose of the LRAA, 
as supported by the Explanatory Memorandum that indicates that the sole 
employment interpretation is what was intended by the legislature.158     
 
 (5) - (a) For the purposes of this subsection, the collective agreements and arbitration awards 
referred to in paragraph (b) are agreements and awards that bound the old employer in respect of 
the employees to be transferred, immediately before the date of transfer. (b) Unless otherwise agreed 
in terms of subsection (6), the new employer is bound by - (i) any arbitration award made in terms of 
this Act, the common law or any other law; (ii) any collective agreement binding in terms of section 
23; and  (iii) any collective agreement binding in terms of section 32 unless a commissioner acting in 
terms of section 62 decides otherwise. 
 (6) - (a) An agreement contemplated in subsection (2) must be in writing and concluded between -
(i) either the old employer, the new employer, or the old and new employers acting jointly, on the one 
hand; and (ii) the appropriate person or body referred to in section 189(1), on the other. (b) In any 
negotiations to conclude an agreement contemplated by paragraph (a), the employer or employers 
contemplated in subparagraph (i), must disclose to the person or body contemplated in subparagraph 
(ii), all relevant information that will allow it to engage effectively in the negotiations.  
(c) Section 16(4) to (14) applies, read with the changes required by the context, to the disclosure of 
information in terms of paragraph (b).  
(7) - The old employer must - (a) agree with the new employer to a valuation as at the date of transfer 
of - (i) the leave pay accrued to the transferred employees of the old employer; (ii) the severance pay 
that would have been payable to the transferred employees of the old employer in the event of a 
dismissal by reason of the employer’s operational requirements; and (iii) any other payments that 
have accrued to the transferred employees but have not been paid to employees of the old employer; 
 (b) conclude a written agreement that specifies - (i) which employer is liable for paying any amount 
referred to in paragraph (a), and in the case of the apportionment of liability between them, the terms 
of that apportionment; and (ii) what provision has been made for any payment contemplated in 
paragraph (a) if any employee becomes entitled to receive a payment; (c) disclose the terms of the 
agreement contemplated in paragraph (b) to each employee who after the transfer becomes 
employed by the new employer; and (d) take any other measure that may be reasonable in the 
circumstances to ensure that adequate provision is made for any obligation on the new employer 
that may arise in terms of paragraph (a). 
 (8) - For a period of 12 months after the date of the transfer, the old employer is jointly and severally 
liable with the new employer to any employee who becomes entitled to receive a payment 
contemplated in subsection (7)(a) as a result of the employee’s dismissal for a reason relating to the 
employer’s operational requirements or the employer’s liquidation or sequestration, unless the old 
employer is able to show that it has complied with the provisions of this section. 
 (9) - The old and new employer are jointly and severally liable in respect of any claim concerning 
any term or condition of employment that arose prior to the transfer. 
(10) - This section does not affect the liability of any person to be prosecuted for, convicted of, and 
sentenced for, any offence. 
157 NUMSA v Assign Services (n17), para 43. 





The LAC concluded that in its view, the sole employment interpretation does not 
have the effect of banning the operation of the TES but only goes as far as 
ensuring that the use of TES is restricted to genuine temporary services as 
defined by the LRAA.159 The TES's rights and obligations towards the placed 
workers seizes to exist as soon as the deeming provision is triggered and the TES 
falls out and the triangular relationship collapses. The LAC was of the view that it 
would make no sense to retain the TES in this triangular relationship for an 
indefinite period where the client has assumed all the rights and obligations of an 
employer towards the placed workers.160  It concluded that, if the TES would be 
retained in the equation after the deeming provision kicks in, it would only be an 
employer in theory and would be adding no value to the relationship. The TES 
would be an unwarranted middleman that serves no purpose to the relationship.161 
The LAC therefore concluded by upholding the CCMA's interpretation of the 
deeming provision that the sole employment interpretation is that which was 
intended by the legislature. Accordingly, the LAC concluded in favour of NUMSA 
and held that the LC misdirected itself when it concluded that dual employment is 
the correct interpretation and thereby setting aside the CCMA award on the 
grounds that it was both unreasonable and incorrect conclusion.162 The dual 
employment interpretation was not supported by the Explanatory Memorandum 
which records the intention of the LRAA.              
4.2 The Constitutional Court’s (Majority) judgement on the Interpretation 
of the deeming Provision – Sole Employment Interpretation  
 
159 Ibid, para 42. 
160 Ibid, para 43. 
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Dissatisfied with the LAC's finding, Assign referred the matter to the CC for final 
determination.163 The CC had to effectively determine what the legislature's 
intentions were when it introduced the amendments in the LRAA. Did the 
legislature intend that sole employment be created as found by the CCMA and the 
LAC? Or is the dual employment interpretation as concluded by Brassey AJ in the 
LC what was intended? Whatever the answer, the CC as court of last instance 
was tasked with this important consideration which had vast implications within the 
South African labour market, particularly on the operation of TES as a practice in 
South Africa.  
It is evident from the history of this litigation that the answer to this consideration 
was not an easy one to arrive at as evident in how it has evoked two closely 
contested schools of thoughts in South African labour jurisprudence. It proved to 
be no different amongst the judges of the CC who delivered two contradicting 
judgments in this matter comprising of the majority judgement which constitutes 
the current legal position, and the dissenting minority judgment which carries 
persuasive value. The majority judgment was delivered by Dlodlo AJ164 whilst 
Cachalia AJ delivered the minority judgment.165          
Rightfully, in addressing this legal challenge, Dlodlo AJ representing the majority 
view of the CC paused to note that the interpretation of the deeming provision has 
profound implication for the TES practice in South Africa, particularly on the TES’s 
ability to operate post the triggering of the deeming  provision. Dlodlo AJ noted 
that Assign may be right in its assertion that the sole employment interpretation is 
 
163 Assign Services (Pty) Limited v NUMSA supra (20). 
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tantamount to a ban of the labour brokering practice in South Africa.166 The CC 
acknowledged that the labour brokering practice contribute significantly to 
employment opportunities in South Africa and that the underlying issue for 
determination in this case had serious implications for the country's labour market 
and the continued role of the labour brokering practice in South Africa. 167 
The court noted that this issue had also significant implications for the rights of all 
the parties involved in the triangular relationship, viz the client of the labour broker 
as well as the thousands of employees currently involved in this practice. Having 
noted these challenges, the majority per Dlodlo AJ proceeded to cite the trite legal 
principles applicable in the interpretation of legislation in the same way the CCMA 
and the LC did in dealing with this matter.168 This thesis has extensively dealt with 
the applicable principles in the interpretation of legislation in the previous chapters 
and the extent to which they are referred to herein again, is only for purposes of 
completion.   
With reference to case law, the CC stated that in interpreting legislation, and in this 
case section 198A of the LRA, it had to consider its textual, contextual as well as 
its purposive meaning. The CC noted that the purpose of section 198A had to be 
considered within the meaning of the right to fair labour practice as entrenched 
within the constitution and the purpose of the LRA as a whole as set out in section 
1 of the LRA.169            
4.2.1 The Constitutional Court’s view on the interpretation of the textual 
context of the deeming provision   
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In considering the textual meaning of the deeming provision, the CC found that the 
deeming provision clearly distinguished between those employees employed by a 
TES to perform temporary work as well as those deemed to be employed by the 
TES's client not performing temporary work. It was held that to interpret the 
deeming provision to mean that the client becomes one of the employers would be 
to strain the language used.170  It was contended by the CC that this was not the 
intention of the legislature and if it were, the legislature could have easily provided 
that the client also becomes the employer after the deeming provision is 
triggered.171  
The CC further rejected any argument that a placed worker could be regarded as 
an employee of a TES in terms of section 213 of the LRA.172  The court held that 
the usual TES employment relationship is not covered by section 213 because if it 
were, there would be no need for section 189(2) of the LRA which creates a 
statutory employment relationship between a TES and placed workers.173 The 
court concluded, as persuaded by arguments from the Casual Workers Advice 
Office (“CWAO”),who were amicus curiae174 in the matter, that a placement of an 
employee with a TES does not create an employment relationship.175 In other 
words, the fact that a worker is placed by a TES with client does not necessarily 
 
170 Ibid, para 54. 
171 Ibid, para 54. 
172 "employee " means – (a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another 
person or for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and  (b) any 
other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an employer, 
and "employed" and "employment" have meanings corresponding to that of " employee"; 
173 Ibid, para 55. 
174 Amicus curiae is a well-established concept in law. Translated literally from Latin, the term means 
'friend of the court. See G Williams 'The amicus curiae and intervention in the High Court of Australia: 
A comparative analysis' (2000). 





mean that a relationship of employment is created between the placed worker and 
the TES, this is not covered by section 213 of the LRA.  
After having reached this conclusion, the CC was quickly confronted with the 
difficulties occasioned by the effect of section 198(4)176 and (4A)177 of the LRA.  
These provisions create joint and several liability for the TES and the client for the 
period while a placed worker is employed with a TES. This period, according to the 
CC, is the period prior to the triggering of the deeming provision and for the period 
thereafter if the contractual relationship between the TES and the client persist 
post the deeming. Once the placed worker is deemed an employee of the client 
after the three-month period, the TES is no longer joint and severally liable if the 
commercial contract between it and the client also comes to an end.178 The TES is 
liable jointly and severally if, after the deeming, the commercial relationship 
between it and the client continues and the TES continues to remunerate the 
placed employees.179   
Assign however held a different view, it argued that the textual context of section 
198(4A) supports the dual employment interpretation because this provision 
facilitates the enforcement of the placed workers' employment rights against both 
 
176 "The temporary employment service and the client are jointly and severally liable if the temporary 
employment service, in respect of any of its employees, contravenes- (a) a collective agreement 
concluded in a bargaining council that regulates terms and conditions of employment; (b) a binding 
arbitration award that regulates terms and conditions of employment; (c) the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act; or (d) a determination made in terms of the Wage Act. 
177 If the client of a temporary employment service is jointly and severally liable in terms of section 
198(4) or is deemed to be the employer of an employee in terms of section 198A(3)(b)- (a) the 
employee may institute proceedings against either the temporary employment service or the client 
or both the temporary employment service and the client; (b) a labour inspector acting in terms of 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act may secure and enforce compliance against the temporary 
employment service or the client as if it were the employer, or both; and (c)  any order or award made 
against a temporary employment service or client in terms of this subsection may be enforced against 
either. 
178 Assign Services v NUMSA supra (n20), para 64. 





the TES and the client.180  In other words, the joint and several liability binds both 
in their capacity as employers of the placed workers post the deeming. A 
preference of the sole employment interpretation would go against this provision 
as it will only recognise one employer, the client, whilst also creating mechanisms 
to allow the placed workers to enforce obligations against the TES as a non-
employer.181  
According to Assign, the joint and several liability between a TES and a client in 
respect of the placed workers continue even if their commercial relationship is 
terminated, this is so because the deeming did not serve to terminate the 
employment relationship between the TES and the placed workers. There was 
nothing in the LRAA that suggested that the deeming ends the relationship 
between the TES and employees placed by it with the client.        
In response to Assigns argument, the CC pointed out that the joint and several 
liability provisions did not seek to suggest dual and joint employment, but only 
sought to create a substantive and statutory form of joint and several liability in 
circumstances where the TES carries principal liability as employer in terms of the 
LRA. This provision did not seek to create dual employment and therefore does 
not hamper the sole employment interpretation.182 The court pressed that the joint 
and several liability provisions do not purport to determine who an employer may 
be from time to time. It merely provides an avenue for placed employees to bring 
claims against the TES after the deeming for as long as the contract between the 
TES and the client survives the triggering of the deeming provision.183 
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The CC concluded that section 198(4A) provides the placed workers with more 
protection as it enables them to bring claims directly against the TES 
notwithstanding it not being their employer post the deeming.184 The CC motivated 
that this provision may have been introduced to address the shortcomings of the 
LRA prior to the 2014 amendments whereby the placed workers were barred from 
directly bringing claims against the client as a non-employer and had to first bring 
a claim against the TES as their employer and thereafter enforce the award/court 
order against the client.  
The CC held that, in terms of section 198(4A) the liability of the TES exists only in 
circumstances where there is still a contract between it and the client, i.e. if the 
TES continue to remunerate the placed workers post the deeming.185 The court 
accordingly rejected Assign’s argument that the textual reading of the provision 
supports their contention of dual employment interpretation. In other words, if the 
commercial contract between the TES and the client is terminated by them post 
the deeming, this had the effect of breaking the tie between the TES and the 
placed worker thus collapsing the triangular relationship and leaving only the client 
as the sole employer of the placed workers.    
4.2.2 The Constitutional Court’s views on the purposive interpretation of 
the deeming provision   
Having reached this conclusion, the CC proceeded to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of what it considers the purposive interpretation of the deeming 
provision. In doing this, the court considered the purpose in terms of which the 
2014 amendments were introduced into the LRA. It noted that the purpose of the 
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amendments is two-fold. The first is to afford better protection to the vulnerable 
workforce earning below the BCEA threshold involved in the labour brokering 
practice. The second is to restrict temporary services to true temporary service, 
that is for a period not exceeding 3 months.186  
The CC noted that the aim of the amendments is not to ban the operation of the 
TES practice, but to properly regulate it. In order to get a proper understanding of 
the purpose of the amendments, it had to rely on the Explanatory Memorandum of 
2012 accompanying the Bill.187 The CC also noted that the Explanatory 
Memorandum confirms that the main thrust of the amendments viz section 198 
and 198A,  are to restrict the employment of more vulnerable, lower paid workers 
by labour brokers to situations of genuine and relevant temporary work and to 
introduce measures to provide additional protection to workers employed by labour 
brokers.188  The court held that the restriction of TES employment to only genuine 
temporary work affords the clarity and precision needed by the LRA to realise the 
constitutional rights to fair labour practice. It concluded that the purpose of section 
198A is to close the gap in accountability between the client and the placed 
workers.189    
Assign further argued, as they had done at the LC, that nowhere in the 
amendments does it suggest that the employment relationship between the TES 
and the placed employee is terminated once the deeming provision is triggered. 
Assign contended that the common law employment relationship between the TES 
and the placed workers continue even after section 198A(3)(b) no longer deem the 
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TES an employer.190 Assign further argued that the effect of the sole employment 
interpretation is that it forces employees to be automatically dismissed by the TES 
and transferred to the client without their consent.191 This, it was argued, has the 
effect that the placed workers could potentially be exposed to employment on less 
favourable terms and conditions of employment by the client in circumstances 
where the TES was providing more favourable employment conditions.192 Assign 
further submitted that the dual employment interpretation gives the workers two 
employers against whom they can claim against, this provides greater protection 
to the workers than the sole employment interpretation currently favoured.193  
The CC once again rejected this argument stating that from a practical 
consideration, the relationship between the TES and the placed workers is not one 
of employment. The TES's role in the triangular relationship is only related to 
human resources function which entails remuneration and discipline of the placed 
workers.194 From a substantive perspective, it is the client that is the employer. 
Further to this, the deeming provision do not create a transfer of employment, but 
rather a change in the statutory attribution of responsibility as employer in the 
triangular relationship. The CC contended that there is no prejudice to the workers 
created by this because the employees continue to perform the work, they were 
performing prior the deeming in the same position.195  
Lastly, the CC held that a dual employment interpretation will be prejudicial to the 
placed workers, this is so because the labour brokering practice was based on a 
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practice that served to obfuscate and protect the client from the obligations that 
flow to an employer in an employment relationship.196  The purpose of the 
amendments was to prevent this and retaining the TES in the triangular 
relationship post the deeming may have the effect of frustrating the purpose of the 
amendments. The sole employment interpretation affords better protection to 
placed workers because it gives them certainty and security of employment and 
therefore better protects the rights of placed workers.197  
The majority view of the CC per Ddlodlo AJ concluded that the absence of 
certainty threatens employees' ability to exercise their LRA rights and that 
uncertainty for employees may give rise to various challenges; such as not 
knowing which employer disciplinary code to comply with, confusions as to which 
employer dismissed an employee in cases of dismissals, confusions in cases of 
industrial action etc.198 It is for these reasons that the CC concluded that the sole 
employment interpretation is the correct one as it is supported by both the 
language and context of the provision. This interpretation represented the majority 
view of the CC, thus setting the legal position on this issue in South African labour 
law.   
4.3 The Constitutional Court’s Minority Judgment on the interpretation of 
the deeming provision- Dual Employment Interpretation 
However, Cachalia AJ, after having had the benefit of first reading the majority 
judgment as discussed above, held a different view as to what the intentions of the 
legislature was when it introduced the deeming provision.  Cachalia AJ held the 
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view that the dual employment interpretation is one that was intended by the 
legislature and is one that makes sense considering the purpose of the 
amendments.199 The acting judge found that an interpretation that gives the 
vulnerable employees two employers is one that affords them better protection 
and this is in line with the purpose of section 198A(3)(b) which is to provide better 
protection to vulnerable lower paid employees, who continue working for a client 
beyond the three months. 
According to Cachalia AJ, the deeming provision merely recognise the client as a 
second employer post the deeming and not as a replacement of the TES. If the 
object was to make the client the sole employer post the deeming, section 
198A(3)(b)(i), instead of being drafted as a deeming provision, could have been 
drafted to specify that after the three months period, a placed employee cease to 
be employed by the TES and is deemed to be an employee of the client.200  
Therefore, the choice of wording adopted by the legislature is consistent with the 
argument that the dual employment was intended. Further to this, the purposive 
interpretation of the deeming provision also does not support the sole employment 
interpretation.201  This was also admitted by the majority decision when it 
considered the joint and several liability provisions. These provisions render the 
client and TES jointly and severally liable for certain contraventions in respect of 
the placed workers. The vulnerable employee continues to enjoy this protection 
under the dual employment interpretation. 
Furthermore, section 198(4A) and section 198A were introduced by the 
amendments at the same time and they both refer to the deeming provision. They 
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expressly stipulate that if a client is deemed to be the employer of an employee in 
terms of the deeming provision, certain employer duties may be enforced against 
either or both the TES and the client.202  The employees are entitled to bring a 
claim against either of the two employers, they have a choice. An award obtained 
against the other is enforceable against the other.203 However, same cannot be 
said for the sole employment interpretation as these vulnerable workers lose this 
protection after the three months if the commercial contract between the TES and 
the client is not maintained. In other words, for them to enjoy this protection, they 
are at the mercy of the TES and the client. This is plainly at odds with the purpose 
of giving placed employees additional protection. 
Cachalia AJ held that, considering the above, it is evident that the dual 
employment interpretation gives the employees added protection by allowing them 
to enforce their employment rights against two employers. This is the meaning of 
the joint and several liability provision, a different interpretation of these provisions 
would not make sense.204 Cachalia AJ further held that, the majority decision's 
finding that section 198(4) creates a substantive and statutory form of joint and 
several liability different from joint or dual employment is incorrect and does not 
make sense. This is so because the provision expressly stipulate that the TES and 
the client are jointly and severally liable in the whole.205 
Furthermore, section 198(4A) also creates substantive rights for the vulnerable 
employees in that it recognises that both the TES and the client assume joint 
obligation towards the employees as employers. There can be no other reason for 
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imposing liability upon both, and once this section is understood in this way, there 
is no room for attempting to explain away the difficulty posed by its language, as 
the majority judgement does, as merely conferring a practical solution to placed 
employees being barred from instituting proceedings if they proceed against the 
incorrect party.206 On the sole employment interpretation, liability is imposed upon 
the TES without it having any obligations as an employer towards the employees. 
As this cannot be, it must thus follow that section 198(4A) supports the dual 
employment interpretation.207   
4.3.1 The problems associated with the CC’s majority view on the         
interpretation of the deeming provision   
Cachalia AJ also noted that the majority view’s decision to prefer the sole 
employment interpretation creates various consequences. For example, the 
placed workers cease to be employees of the TES for purpose of the LRA post the 
deeming. This is so even though nowhere in the LRA or the LRAA is it stipulated 
that the deeming provision ends the relationship between the TES and the placed 
workers.208 He noted that the contract of employment between the TES and the 
worker is supposed to remain post the deeming, though without the additional 
benefits of the LRA. Cachalia AJ further noted that in terms of the sole 
employment interpretation, the worker is also transferred to the client without their 
consent and without their accrued employment rights being transferred to the 
client as a new employer.209 There is also no employment contract being entered 
between the client and the workers. The only protection to the employees is that 
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they are deemed indefinitely employed and are not treated less favourably than 
employees of the client doing the same or similar work.210  
Cachalia AJ also noted that the above raises various questions, for example, on 
what terms will the workers be employed if the client has no employees doing 
same or similar work? And if they were employed on better terms by the TES 
compared to employees of the client doing similar work, will they be downgraded 
to those inferior terms? These possible consequences are obviously averse to the 
purpose of the LRAA which is to provide additional protection to vulnerable 
workers involved in the labour brokering practice.  
The minority judgement noted that, instead of providing additional protection, the 
sole employment interpretation places these workers in even weaker positions in 
certain instances. The sole employment interpretation is therefore clearly wrong 
considering the purpose of the LRAA.  It is evident that the LRAA has no 
transitional provisions that serve to transfer the workers to the client post the 
deeming. It is thus evident that the legislature intended for both employment 
relationships to continue in tandem.     
The minority judgment also noted that a further consideration is the fact that the 
BCEA and the LRA had been aligned to speak to each other when the LRAA was 
introduced. Both these statutes define an employee and a temporary employment 
service in the same terms.211 These statutes are aligned to reflect that the TES is 
the employer of the employees placed with the client.212  The dual employment 
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interpretation is consistent with this alignment whereas the sole employment 
interpretation disturbs it.213  Therefore, the acting judge concluded that having 
considered the purpose, language and context of the deeming provision, and 
having considered the alignment with the BCEA, there is no room for ambiguity, 
the dual employment interpretation is the only interpretation that can reasonably 
be ascribed to the deeming provision. 
The Acting Judge held that in his view the deeming provision creates a statutory 
employment relationship between the placed workers and the client in addition to 
the already existing employment relationship between the employee and the TES 
and not in substitution thereof.214 He concluded that if it were up to him, he would 
have upheld the appeal.       
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSION  
5.1.  Introduction   
Temporary Employment Services as a practice has been a part of the South 
African labour framework for many years, though not adequately regulated.215 The 
lack of adequate regulation caused an outcry from organised labour after the 
Constitutional dispensation, challenging the constitutionality of this practice, 
comparing it to modern day slavery.216 Union federations argued that this practice 
was a sham that served to exploit workers for the benefit of employers and thus 
called for the complete ban of this practice.217  
The legislature, instead of completely banning the operation of the TES practice, 
introduced the LRAA, the purpose of which was to protect the vulnerable 
employees involved in this practice.218  One of the controversial mechanisms 
introduced by the amendments was the deeming provision which deemed the 
client an employer after a period of three months has lapsed with an employee 
placed with it by a TES.219 The CC has interpreted this provision to mean that after 
the three months period has lapsed, the client becomes the sole employer and the 
TES falls away from the relationship.220  
The CC’s interpretation of the deeming provision has been controversial as it has 
detrimental implications to the sustenance of the TES practice in South Africa. 
 
215 LRA of 1956. 
216 http://www.cosatu.org.za/show.php?ID=10371 (Last accessed 28 November 2018). 
217 COSATU, FAWU, NEHAWU, NUM, NUMSA, SACCAWU; AND SATAWU “Submissions on 
Labour Brokering to the Parliament Portfolio Committee 26 August 2009”, page 2.  
218 Assign Services v Krost supra (n15), para 5.17  
219 Section 198A(3)(b)(i) of the LRA. 





Consequently, the strict restriction of the operation of the TES practice also 
generally has detrimental implications on the economy.          
5.2  The implications of the Constitutional Court’s decision on the 
triangular relationship  
The TES practice creates a triangular relationship between the parties involved. 
The one relationship is between the TES and the employees it places with the 
client. The TES is a statutory employer of the placed employees prior to the 
deeming provision being triggered.221 Another relationship is the one between the 
TES and the client which is normally regulated by a SLA.222 The SLA generally 
stipulates the terms and conditions in terms of which the TES will provide 
employees to the client to render temporary services in favour of the client in 
exchange for a fee payable by the client to the TES.223  Another relationship that 
exists is the one between the client and the employees placed with it by the 
TES.224     
The CC has concluded that the deeming provision should be interpreted to favour 
the sole employment interpretation, that is after the three months of placement, the 
client becomes alone the employer of the placed workers.225 The CC has taken it a 
step further to say that the triggering of the deeming provision automatically 
excludes the TES from the equation thus causing the triangular relationship to 
collapse.226 The CC was of the view that it would be pointless to retain the TES in 
the equation if the client has taken over all the rights and responsibilities of an 
 
221 Section 198(2) of the LRA. 
222 Van Eck BPS “Temporary employment services (Labour Brokers) in South Africa and Namibia” 
(2010) 13(2) PER 107 pg.108.   
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid. 
225 Assign Services v NUMSA supra (n20), para 61. 





employer in respect of the placed workers.227 Therefore, once the deeming 
provision is triggered and the client takes over the responsibilities as an employer 
of the placed workers, the TES will no longer be considered as an employer of the 
placed workers even for purposes of the LRA.  
The CC has held that, since nothing in the LRAA suggests that the triggering of 
the deeming provision ends the SLA between the TES and the client, if the TES 
and the client elects to retain the SLA post the deeming and that the TES continue 
remunerating the placed workers, this is the only manner in which the TES may 
still have some liability towards the placed workers.228 The CC is of the view that 
the joint and several liability provision under the LRA survives post the deeming 
provision for as long as the SLA between the TES and the client remains in 
operation. In this instance, the TES is jointly and severally liable towards the 
placed employees as a non-employer. The CC was at pains to stress that the joint 
and several liability provisions is not to be interpreted to support the dual 
employment interpretation.229    
The CC’s decision is also that the placed employees must be placed on the same 
terms and conditions as employee of the client doing similar work, with the same 
employment benefits, the same prospects of internal growth and the same job 
security that follows and that their employment is indefinite.230 However, the 
placed employee’s benefits and length of service with the TES are not transferred 
to the client. The implication is that the employment relationship between the 
placed worker and the client starts on a clean slate.  The implication of the CC’s 
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decision on the triangular relationship therefore is that it automatically terminates 
the employment relationship contemplated by section 198(2) between the TES 
and the placed workers because after a period exceeding three months, the 
placed workers are no longer rendering a temporary service.        
5.3 Should the Dual Employment Interpretation have been preferred? 
As Brassey J, in my view, correctly found, the deeming provision serves to 
augment the relationship by bringing in an additional employer for purposes of the 
LRA as oppose to replacing one employer for another.231 This interpretation in my 
view provides a broader protection for job security for the placed workers as they 
now have an additional employer to bring a claim against in cases of unfair 
treatment.  
By adding the client as an employer to the relationship, the deeming provision 
added additional protection to the placed workers. To my mind, this is in line with 
the purpose of the amendments as evident in the Explanatory Memorandum. That 
is to provide additional protection to the vulnerable employees. One would think 
that an interpretation that widens the scope of employment is one that brings 
better protection to the placed worker's jobs as opposed to an interpretation that 
forces an unwilling employer to be the sole employer of the placed workers.  
Since the client is effectively forced by this interpretation to be an employer, there 
is a risk that after the deeming provision has been triggered, the placed workers 
could face retrenchment. Furthermore, if retrenched, the employees would not be 
entitled to any severance packages since they would have no continued service 
for more than a year as required in terms of section 41(2) of the BCEA in order to 
 





qualify for severance package in cases of dismissals for operational 
requirements.232  
5.4 Does the Constitutional Court’s decision constitute a ban of the TES 
practice in South Africa?       
What is apparent from the decision of the CC is that the provisions of section 198A 
(1) and the deeming provision have been interpreted in a manner that has 
extremely restricted the use of temporary employment services in South Africa. 
The CC has said that, because section 198A(1) inter alia restricts the definition of 
‘temporary employment services’ to services that are no longer than three months, 
any services procured beyond three months is not genuine temporary 
employment, and this is the reason why the client becomes the sole employer 
after the three months.233 Temporary employment services have now been strictly 
restricted to services under three months.      
Given the fact that the deeming provision have not been interpreted to bring to an 
end the SLA between the TES and its client, the only conceivable practical benefit 
to be enjoyed by clients from this arrangement is if they continue to use the TES 
for the administrative aspect of the relationship. Although the client takes over all 
the employer obligations under the LRA, it can delegate all the administrative 
aspects of the employment relationship to be conducted by the TES. The TES can 
continue paying the placed workers’ salaries, managing their leave, performing the 
disciplinary functions etc, and in return the TES will continue to receive a fee. 
Because of the TES no longer being considered to have any employment 
 
232 An employer must pay an employee who is dismissed for reasons based on the employer’s 
operational requirements severance pay equal to at least one week’s remuneration for each 
completed year of continuous service with that employer, calculated in accordance with section 35.  





obligations and liability towards the placed employees, the fee received from the 
client is likely to be significantly low. Furthermore, if the SLA is still intact post the 
deeming provision, the TES and the client will remain jointly and severally liable 
under the joint and several liability provision.234      
Considering the above, it is apparent that the CC’s preference of the deeming 
provision has not banned the operation of the TES practice in the strict sense. The 
implication of the CC’s decision is that it has restricted the use of labour brokering 
only to what it considers ‘genuine temporary employment services’.  However, 
from a practical consideration, it is difficult to consider how the TES practice will 
survive considering the limited and restricted manner in which it is now expected 
to operate.  
The CC’s decision and interpretation of the deeming provision has stripped the 
TES practice of almost all the benefits to the TES and the client that was normally 
associated with the practice. The client now assumes sole responsibility and 
liability towards the employees in respect of employee rights flowing from the LRA. 
Because of this, the client will no longer see a reason to pay the TES a lucrative 
fee even if it elects to continue utilising the TES post the deeming provision. This 
is so because the TES will only be performing administrative responsibilities 
towards the placed employees without any risks as to liabilities save for section 
198(4) of the LRA.           
Considering the above, my view is that it can be considered that the CC’s decision 
has banned the use of TES in South Africa, though not completely. This is so 
because the TES practice is no longer conducted as it used to, and it no longer 
 





serves the purpose for which the practice was intended. In fact, Dlodlo AJ 
representing the majority decision admitted that the preference of the sole 
employment interpretation may be tantamount to ban of the operation of the TES 
practice in South Africa235. I respectfully agree with Dlodlo AJ’s sentiments in this 
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